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AUTHOR’S PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION
Some thirty years ago, in 1982, Ludwig Buisson who held the chair in 
Medieval History at Hamburg University, Germany, drew my attention 
to the campaigns of Saint Louis, the French Crusader king. It was then 
when I fĳirst came across those striking references in Western sources of 
the late thirteenth century, most of them in Old French, describing the 
negotiating procedures and agreements between Crusader/Frankish and 
Muslim rulers in the years 1249 and 1254, which as a young historian and 
orientalist immediately caught my attention and fascinated me. I began to 
consult the early Mamluk historiography in order to improve my under-
standing of both negotiating techniques and the political strategies that 
provided the basis for agreements between Franks and Muslims. Under 
the guidance of Ludwig Buisson and Albrecht Noth, the inspiring head 
of the Hamburg School of Oriental Studies and great expert of Muslim 
historiography, this led me to fĳinally conduct a full research into Frankish-
Muslim alliances and treaties in the Middle East from the appearance 
of the fĳirst Crusaders in the region to Mamluk rule in Egypt and Syria: 
I choose to base my work on a comprehensive assessment of both Western 
and Muslim sources in parallel, and the idea to formulate questions and 
answers only from the simultaneous analysis of both groups of sources. 
Hamburg University accepted my study as a PhD thesis in 1987, and De 
Gruyter published it in German four years later, in 1991, in the series Stud-
ies on the Language, History and Culture of the Islamic Orient (vol. 12).1 
In the following years, my academic and other professional career 
interests developed in other directions, focusing more on contemporary 
Muslim history and the day-to-day challenges of political and technical 
cooperation between Europe and the Muslim world, with which today 
I am dealing both as a professor for Europe and the Mediterranean in 
Bruges, Belgium, and as an offfĳicial of the European Commission. It was 
all the more a surprise, and a delightful and flattering one, when in 2002 
Peter M. Holt of the School of Oriental and African Studies in London 
1 Michael A. Köhler, Allianzen und Verträge zwischen fränkischen und islamischen 
Herrschern im Vorderen Orient. Eine Studie über das zwischenstaatliche Zusammenleben 
vom 12. bis ins 13. Jahrhundert, Berlin – New York 1991 (Studien zur Sprache, Geschichte, 
und Kultur des Islamischen Orients. Beihefte zur Zeitschrift Der Islam, ed. Albrecht Noth, 
Neue Folge Band 12).
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viii author’s preface to the english translation
 contacted me with the information that he had started to translate my 
study on Frankish-Muslim alliances and treaties into English in order to 
enable his non-German speaking students to access the results of my work. 
Professor Holt soon asked me to authorise the publication of the English 
translation of the book, which I was only too happy to give. However, it 
proved unfortunately impossible to fĳinalise the translation and fĳind a suit-
able publisher before Professor Holt’s death in 2006. This seemed to put 
the project to a sudden halt. 
But the story should continue, with a very pleasant déjà-vu: In 2010 
Konrad Hirschler asked me if my book had ever been translated into Eng-
lish, as like Peter M. Holt before him he regretted that the language barrier 
made it increasingly difffĳicult to make full use of the study in his teaching 
at the School of Oriental and African Studies. I informed Dr Hirschler of 
Peter M. Holt’s earlier request and translation work, and Konrad Hirschler 
was soon able to fĳind and access the still unfĳinished English manuscript 
in Harris Manchester College Library, Oxford. He immediately decided to 
continue where Peter Holt had stopped, to complete the translation and 
fĳinally submit it to Koniklijke Brill in Leiden for publication.
I am greatly indebted to both the late Peter M. Holt and to Konrad 
Hirschler and his team at SOAS for their generous work on the English 
version of this book and their enormous effforts to bring the results of 
my work to the attention of English language readers. Speakers of both 
languages will notice that while throughout faithful to the German origi-
nal, the English version is somewhat shorter and sometimes summarizes 
the German text; it is also more economic with respect to references and 
quotes from Latin, Arabic and Old French sources. This makes the text 
more fluent. Readers who wish to have access to the full text including all 
references and bibliography may wish to go back to the German version. 
Dr Hirschler’s contribution has not been limited to editing and put-
ting the fĳinishing touches on Peter M. Holt’s translation. In his preface he 
very usefully places the fĳindings of my study in the context of the results 
of specialist research published in the last two decades, which has shed 
further light on individual aspects of motivation of alliances and of dip-
lomatic practice. Indeed, there is ample room for further research in this 
fĳield, and in particular the study of Syrian history under the Bahri Mam-
luks based on an examination of the many still unedited Arabic sources 
of the later thirteenth and fourteenth centuries would promise to provide 
deeper insights. 
While I hope I can still add further contributions to this subject of 
research, I am delighted that today, some 25 years after the conclusion 
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of work on the original German text, my study on alliances and treaties 
is still deemed relevant enough to warrant an English translation which 
will make it available to a wider readership. Political relations between 
the Muslim world and the West if anything have become ever more com-
plex in the last quarter of a century since this book was written, and con-
frontation in the region between countries, within societies, and with the 
involvement of outside players ever more frequent and bitter. Therefore, 
not only the fĳindings but also the purpose of this book may still have their 
justifĳication today. As I stated in my concluding remarks: “For better or 
worse, history is also used or misused for the purpose of legitimization and 
historical events as well as tendencies are even occasionally understood 
as direct instructions for dealing with the present. In view of this practi-
cal relevance of history, whether intentional or unintentional, it is all the 
more urgent that what we comprehend as history should be confronted 
with changed methodologies. Applied to the Frankish-Muslim encoun-
ters of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in the Middle East, called the 
‘Crusades’ for the lack of a better term, it might happen that both West-
ern and Arabic scholars would no longer read the sources merely as con-
frontational, but would obtain the formulation of new questions from the 
Arabic sources in particular. If by this means a small step could be taken 
towards the separation of ideology from the debate about the encounter 
of Europe and the Islamic world in the past and a scrap of the historical 
burden lifted from the dialogue between Europe and the Arabs, much 
would already have been achieved.”
I would like to take this occasion to thank all those who contributed 
in one way or another to making this book possible: Ludwig Buisson and 
Albrecht Noth who guided and advised me, constantly encouraged me 
and supervised my PhD thesis; Peter M. Holt and Konrad Hirschler for 
their initiative, all their hard work and enthusiastic support which has 
made this English translation possible, and Brill Publishers who accepted 
to make it available to the public; My mother Margret and my father Volk-
mar Köhler for all their help in every situation and in particular during my 
student’s years—I would have wished that my father was still with us to 
see the publication of this book!; And my wife Ina who since we met at 
university studying Medieval Islam has become my trusted companion for 
three decades, helped me fĳinish my PhD, went with me to live and work 
in Northern Africa, and gave birth to our much-loved children.
Michael A. Köhler 
Brussels, October 2012
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FOREWORD
‘Books of this kind are seldom translated into English. That is a pity, for 
this work deserves to be widely known not merely among specialists in 
the history of the crusades, but to all who are interested in East-West 
relations.’1 Thus the late James Powell concluded his review of the pres-
ent work, one that deals with the coexistence of Frankish, that is Latin 
European, and Muslim states in the Middle East during the period of the 
Crusades. Although more than two decades have elapsed since the publi-
cation of the German version (and Powell’s review) the book’s originality 
still warrants a translation. Many historical studies have remained bound 
to the idea that ‘the virtually permanent confrontation [between Mus-
lim and Frankish states] was inevitable’, as a study on the principality of 
Damascus put it.2 This book’s argument questions such a historicization 
and re-examines the available source material, mainly in Latin, Arabic 
and Greek. It argues that after their foundation, the Frankish states were 
swiftly absorbed into the political landscape of Syrian autonomous lord-
ships, wherein a characteristic pattern of alliances and treaties evolved, 
preventing the intrusion of external powers and the rise of any one par-
ticular lordship to a position of dominance. The integration of the Frank-
ish states was facilitated by the development of specifĳic legal instruments, 
such as the condominium (munasafa) and the suspension clause, which 
were employed in treaties. 
Beyond doubt, research has revised or at least refĳined some arguments 
to which the book refers. For example, the motives for individuals to sup-
port or join the Crusades, an issue that features prominently in this book’s 
fĳirst chapter, is to a large extent explained here by materialistic factors, 
be they of an economic, political or social nature. This issue has since 
been considered in more subtle ways and, in contrast to the explanation 
offfered here, recent work has put more emphasis on spiritual motives—if 
one wants to adopt such a binary perspective.3 A second example where 
scholarship has evolved, to take an issue from the fĳield of Arabic/Islamic 
1 Powell, J.: Review of M.A. Köhler, Allianzen und Verträge, in: The American Historical 
Review 98/3 (1993), 850.
2 Mouton, J.-M.: Damas et sa principauté: sous les Saljoukides et les Bourides 468–549/
1076–1154, Cairo 1994, 49 (despite citing this book).
3 Cf. the overview in Housley, N.: Contesting the Crusades, Oxford 2006, 75–98.
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studies, is the source value of jihad treatises and poetry. Writings such as 
those by Ali ibn Tahir al-Sulami (d. 500/1106), especially his early jihad 
treatise against the Crusaders, have been studied in more detail and in 
particular Christie has underlined his signifĳicance for later writers.4 The 
present book’s point on the employment of jihad-propaganda is still a cru-
cial contribution to this debate, but needs to be set against more favour-
able readings of the oeuvre of poets such as Ibn Munir (d. 548/1153) and 
Ibn al-Qaysarani (d. 548/1154) over the past years.5
However, in other regards research over the last two decades has con-
fĳirmed the book’s main thrust or has advanced arguments that neatly 
fĳit into its main thesis. The conquest of Jerusalem in 1099 and the treat-
ment of the local populations by the Crusaders, for instance, have been 
subject to revisionist studies such as those by Kedar. These studies have 
argued that the number of victims during the early conquest was lower 
than previously thought. That the Crusaders did not, even at such an early 
point, necessarily engage in full-scale massacres of local populations con-
fĳirms an important argument of this book. In the same vein more studies 
are now available on a fĳield closely related to the relations between Frank-
ish and Muslim rulers, namely day-to-day relationships between Franks 
and local populations. The work by Ellenblum on patterns of settlement, 
for instance, confĳirms to some extent the close political integration pre-
sented in the present book. Just as the Franks did not remain political 
outsiders to the Syrian political landscape, they also settled well beyond 
the walls of their fortifĳied cities in the vicinity of (mostly Christian) locales 
in rural areas.6
With this translation the book’s main argument will be accessible to 
a wider audience and will also be more widely taken up in scholarship. 
Over the last two decades several studies on diplomatic contacts between 
Frankish and Muslim states have been published. However, these have 
4 Christie, N.: Motivating Listeners in the Kitab al-Jihad of ʿAli ibn Tahir al-Sulami 
(d. 1106), in: Crusades 6 (2007), 1–14. Christie, N.: Jerusalem in the Kitab Al-Jihad of ʿAli ibn 
Tahir Al-Sulami, in: Medieval Encounters: Jewish, Christian and Muslim Culture in Conflu-
ence and Dialogue 13 (2007), 209–221; Christie, N.: The Book of the Jihad of ʿAli ibn Tahir al-
Sulami (d. 1106): Text, Translation and Commentary, London: Ashgate Press, forthcoming.
5 Cf. Hillenbrand, C.: The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, Edinburgh 1999. Latifff, O.: The 
Place of Faḍāʾil al-Quds (Merits of Jerusalem) Literature and Religious Poetry in the Muslim 
Efffort to Recapture Jerusalem during the Crusades, PhD Thesis (Royal Holloway University 
of London) 2011.
6 Kedar, B.Z.: The Jerusalem Massacre of July 1099 in the Western Historiography of the 
Crusades, in: Crusades 3 (2004), 15–75; Ellenblum, R.: Frankish Rural Settlement in the Latin 
Kingdom of Jerusalem, Cambridge 1998.
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generally been short articles that could neither match the depth and 
breadth of this book nor offfer a comparable conceptualization.7 Other 
studies have brought up new issues, but remained typically focused on 
one set of sources, either Latin or Arabic.8 Recent textbooks on the Cru-
sades such as those by Tyerman and Phillips certainly pay much more 
attention to the interaction between Frankish and Muslim states as to the 
interaction between Franks and indigenous populations, be they Muslim, 
Christian or Jewish.9 Yet their main focus is on the internal workings of 
these states and the history of crusading campaigns so the rich history 
of the interaction of these states within the Middle East remains rather 
marginal. It might be expected that a text-book on the Middle East for 
the period of the Crusades would adopt a diffferent perspective and allow 
the Frankish states to be seen more as a part of this region’s history rather 
than fĳirst and foremost as part of European medieval history. Yet, such 
a text-book is still a desideratum and the text-book by Holt is not only 
outdated, but its title was anyway a misnomer for a book that is basically 
a (very fĳine) history of the Mamluk Empire.10
If we move away from the academic fĳield towards books specifĳically 
authored for non-academic audiences, the framework of presenting the 
interaction between Frankish and Muslim states is deeply influenced by 
the approaches of the mid-twentieth century. Such books still reflect the 
idea of the Crusades as colonial endeavours and the Frankish states as 
colonial entities that remained fundamentally alien to their Middle East-
ern environment throughout their existence, as was argued by Prawer for 
  7 For instance: Dajani-Shakeel, H.: Diplomatic Relations Between Muslim and Frankish 
Rulers, 1097–1153 ad, in: M. Shatzmiller (ed.): Crusaders and Muslims in Twelfth-Century 
Syria, Leiden 1993, 190–215; Frenkel, Y.: Muslim Responses to the Frankish Dominion in 
the Near East (1098–1291), in: C. Kostick, (ed.): The Crusades and the Near East. Cultural 
Histories, London 2010, 27–54; Friedman, Y.: Peacemaking: Perceptions and Practices in 
the Medieval Latin East, in: ibid., 229–257.
 8 Cf. Friedman, Y.: Gestures of Conciliation: Peacemaking Endeavors in the Latin East, 
in: I. Shagrir et al. (eds.): In laudem Hierosolymitani. Studies in Crusades and Medieval 
Culture in Honour of Benjamin Z. Kedar, Aldershot 2007, 31–48.
  9 Tyerman, C.: God’s War: A New History of the Crusades, London 2006, ch. 6. Phillips, J.: 
The Crusades, 1095–1197, Harlow 2002.
10 Holt, P.M.: The Age of the Crusades. The Near East from the Eleventh Century to 1517, 
London/New York 1986. Holt, P.M.: The Crusader States and Their Neighbours, 1098–1291, 
Harlow 2004 offfers little additional insights and is a summary version of The Age of the 
Crusades. Cobb, P.: Enemies of God. An Islamic History of the Crusades, Oxford forthcoming 
will fĳinally fĳill this gap.
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instance.11 This is even true for the otherwise excellent and well-informed 
book by Waterson that is underpinned by a teleological narrative of a 
‘Muslim resistance’ that crystallises after somewhat hesitant beginnings 
under the holy trinity of jihad-studies, that is Imad al-Din Zengi, his son 
Nur al-Din and Saladin, from the 1140s onwards. After a temporary relapse 
under the Ayyubid dynasty in the early thirteenth century, according to 
this narrative history fĳinds its predestined course in the second half of 
this century under the Mamluks and their aggressive policies towards the 
remaining Frankish polities.12
Against such a background of historiographical development, this book 
still makes an important contribution to the fĳield and invites us to rethink 
modern perceptions and scholarship of these events. Professor Peter Holt 
of SOAS translated most of the book between 1999 and 2001, but he was 
not able to revise and publish it before his death in 2006. It was only in 
2010 that the manuscript came to my attention and the project could be 
concluded. 
On an editorial note: The number of footnotes of the original has been 
signifĳicantly reduced. References to secondary sources were only adopted 
if explicitly referred to in the main text or if they are indispensable for fol-
lowing the text’s argument. References to primary sources, however, were 
generally retained in order to make the text’s line of argument transpar-
ent. The bibliography lists all primary and secondary works used in the 
German original, even if not cited in this translation, to give an insight 
into the works consulted. Despite the publication of newer editions for 
many of the primary sources, the original references were retained to 
ensure consistency. Full transcription of Arabic terms has been limited to 
the references and some terminological discussion in the main text where 
it was indispensable. In all other cases diacritics are omitted, though 
hamza (ʾ) and ʿayn (ʿ) have been retained throughout the text.
I am thankful to the libraries that made this project possible: Sue  Killoran 
(Harris Manchester College Library, Oxford) generously granted access to 
Peter Holt’s manuscript and Malcolm Raggett (Centre for Digital Africa, 
Asia and the Middle East, SOAS library) provided invaluable  technical 
11  Prawer, J.: The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem: European Colonialism in the Middle Ages, 
London 1972. Prawer, J.: The Roots of Medieval Colonialism, in: V.P. Goss (ed.): The Meeting 
of Two Worlds: Cultural Exchange between East and West during the Period of the Crusades, 
Kalamazoo 1986, 23–38.
12 Waterson, J.: Sacred Swords: Jihad in the Holy Land 1097–1291, Barnsley 2010. It goes 
without saying that simplistic books such as Bartlett, W.B.: Islam’s War against the Crusad-
ers, Stroud 2008 adopt this approach even more clearly.
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assistance in digitizing the typewritten manuscript. S. Namir Henrikson 
(SOAS) meticulously edited the fĳirst digital draft of the work and Emma 
Diab (New York University) and Suzanne Ruggi (Salisbury) saved me from 
a number of linguistic mistakes and rendered the translation into clearer, 
more readable English. The Faculty of Arts and Humanities, SOAS, sup-
ported this project fĳinancially in its initial stages. I am grateful to Michael 
Brett, Jonathan Phillips, Gerald Hawting, Yehoshua Frenkel, Doris Behrens-
Abouseif and the anonymous reader for offfering advice at diffferent stages 
of the project. My thanks go also to Andrew and Harriet Holt and particu-
larly to Michael Köhler who has supported the transation of this book in 
many ways. I am most profoundly indebted to the late Albrecht Noth, one 
of the co-supervisors of the PhD thesis underlying this book, who intro-
duced me to it when I was an undergraduate student at the University of 
Hamburg.
Konrad Hirschler
London, October 2012
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INTRODUCTION
‘In the fĳield of Crusades studies the history of institutions has increas-
ingly replaced the history of events. The former has become the dominant 
approach.’1
This assessment of the historiography of Crusades succinctly summarises 
the development of the fĳield since the 1930s and particularly since the end 
of the Second World War. Nineteenth-century studies on the crusading 
period had focused on the critical edition and discussion of the sources. 
Early overviews of the history of this period, in turn, were characterised 
by historical positivism and they mainly narrated the history of events, 
especially the history of specifĳic expeditions to the East, only occasionally 
combined with cultural history. Since the 1930s, however, research has 
turned towards the ‘Crusader states’ with a particular emphasis on the 
legal and social structures of the formation of these states and the history 
of settlement. In addition, themes such as economy, war, church and art 
were subject to examination.2
This reorientation has signifĳicantly expanded our knowledge of the 
political, legal, administrative, social and economic conditions of the 
states that were founded in the course of the Crusades. Nevertheless, 
turning away from the history of events had the efffect of virtually stop-
ping research on the Frankish-Muslim relations during the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries, especially concerning the political and legal history 
of the relationships of the Frankish states with their Muslim neighbours. 
An additional reason for this development was that Western historians 
could—and can—access the Arabic sources from the twelfth to the fĳif-
teenth centuries only in translation. It is not by chance that the decreased 
interest in the history of relationships coincided with the point when the 
information of the two partial translations of Ibn al-Qalanisi (d. 555/1160) 
had been integrated into scholarship.3 Since this point no signifĳicant trans-
lation of Arabic sources pertinent to the Crusades has been published. 
Those few contributions that have during the last decades advanced our 
1 Mayer, Aspekte, 84.
2 Ibid., 82–5; Cardini, Studi. The best bibliographies are Atiya, Crusade; Mayer, Biblio-
graphie; Mayer, Literaturbericht. The Bulletin of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and 
the Latin East (since 1981) contains a regular bibliography of relevant publications.
3 Gibb, Damascus Chronicle and Le Tourneau, Damas.
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knowledge on Frankish-Muslim relations were either authored by ori-
entalists or those few medievalists who had Arabic.4 These studies have 
especially focused on the period of Saladin (1169–1193),5 the Ayyubids 
(1193–1260)6 and the early Mamluks (1250–1291).7 However, they primarily 
deal with specifĳic Frankish-Muslim treaties or are biographies and dynas-
tic histories in which the relationships of the rulers with the Franks are 
only one among many subjects. Although these studies have elucidated 
some aspects of the policies and technicalities of treaties they do not 
offfer a continuous history and interpretation of Frankish-Muslim state 
relations from the First Crusade onwards. The few attempts in this regard 
have been very brief publications whose medievalist authors have insuf-
fĳiciently taken into account the Arabic sources and no monograph on the 
development and the context of Frankish-Muslim relations in the Middle 
East, especially during the twelfth century, has been published yet.8
The groundbreaking studies by Prawer on settlement and by Riley-Smith 
on administration have shown that the Crusaders adopted a number of 
existing administrative institutions during the process of state forma-
tion. However, with regard to their relationships the view has persisted 
in the fĳield that the Frankish states remained outposts of the Christian 
world and foreign elements in the largely Islamic Middle East. The image 
of the period as one of Christian-Islamic confrontation that the major-
ity of Western sources—less so the work by William of Tyre (d. 1186)—
projected reinforced this view. These Latin and Old French sources were 
for the most part written in Europe often by authors who had previously 
gone to Syria and Palestine as ‘armed pilgrims’. Modern studies have 
heavily relied on these sources and Arabic sources—as far as available 
in translation—have been only used as supplementary material. In addi-
tion, the use of these sources has been highly problematic as evident 
in the history of reception of Usama b. Munqidh’s (488–584/1095–1188) 
autobiography. Older research considered it as the classical example of 
the Frankish- Muslim modus vivendi of the twelfth century that displays 
a spirit of  tolerance and proves the acculturation of the Franks in the 
4 Most signifĳicantly, Cahen, Syrie and his subsequent studies.
5 Especially, Ehrenkreutz, Saladin; Möhring, Saladin; Möhring, Salahadinus Tyrannus; 
Lyons/Jackson, Saladin.
6 Gottschalk, Friedensangebote; Gottschalk, Untergang; Gottschalk, Al-Kāmil; Dahl-
manns, Al-Malik al-ʿĀdil; Humphreys, Saladin.
7 Richard, Partage; Holt, Treaty with Acre; Holt, Treaty with Genua; Holt, Treaties; Holt, 
Baybars’s Treaty; Thorau, Baibars.
8 Riley-Smith, Peace; Hiestand, Kreuzzug und Friedensidee.
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Middle East.9 More recently this perception was turned around and Usama 
b. Munqidh re-emerged as the main witness for the cultural discrepancy 
between the two camps and for the ‘spirit of counter-crusading’ that sup-
posedly developed on the Islamic side in reaction to the Crusades.10 The 
study of the reception of jihad propaganda by Muslim rulers in chronicles 
and poetry of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, especially by Sivan, 
has further contributed to interpreting Frankish-Muslim relations as one 
of a confrontation between Christianity and Islam (cf. chapter II). Inter-
estingly, modern Arabic historiography has adopted this concept and has 
represented the jihad against the Crusades as a precursor for successfully 
fĳighting back European imperialism. The foundation of Israel has only 
increased the topicality of the Crusades, especially for Middle Eastern 
authors.11 Yet, was the history of Frankish-Muslim relations in the Middle 
East really a confrontation between Christendom and Islam; was it really 
characterised by the spirit of crusading and counter-crusading as Western 
sources suggested and as modern historiography partly argued? If this was 
indeed the case, were the examples of Frankish-Muslim cooperation—
that are well known to modern historiography—merely isolated occur-
rences that should be explained in terms of ‘tolerance’ and ‘policies of 
modus vivendi’?
Against the background of these questions, the present study analyses 
the Frankish states’ legal and political relations with their Muslim neigh-
bours in the Middle East. The study’s aim is not only to list examples of 
cooperation documented in Latin, Arabic, Greek and Christian Orien-
tal sources. Rather, the central point is to analyse alliances and treaties 
involving the Frankish states with regard to their rationale, their support-
ers and their detractors on both sides. Was there a Frankish or Islamic 
policy of alliances, what were the underlying political concepts and what 
developments are traceable? What was the actual relevance of the ideas 
of crusading and jihad? A fĳinal aim of the study is to analyse the legal 
framework that was used for contacts between Frankish and Muslim rul-
ers. Was there also development over time with regard to the content 
and instruments of treaties? A crucial point of the method proposed 
here in order to address these questions is that Arabic sources cannot 
merely supplement Western sources, but that they have to be used in 
 9 Munro, Christian; Duncalf, Influences.
10 Haddad, Muslim Eyes.
11 Sivan, Crusades; Ende, Glaubensheld; Altoma, Treatment; Ochsenwald, Crusader.
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 conjunction and that they have to be considered to be of equal value. In 
some regards, the Arabic sources are even to be preferred over the Latin 
or Old French counterparts. Most of the Frankish and Western sources 
were either authored with reference to specifĳic Crusades or pilgrimages 
or they are ‘offfĳicial’ historiography—as in the case of William of Tyre. The 
Arabic texts, by contrast, ignore any concept of Crusade or jihad history. 
Consequently, they offfer more than just the Islamic perspective on events 
and processes that are known from Western sources. Arabic sources are 
not only more numerous, but their main advantage is that they report 
on the Franks within the general history of the Middle East. Exactly this 
advantage disappears in the published translations that often include only 
those passages that concern the Franks.
The Oriental sources (Arabic, Syriac and Armenian) are particularly 
rich on account of the plurality of genres and—in the case of chronicles—
their annalistic-compilatory character. If the works were not commis-
sioned panegyrics, the authors generally compiled the relevant reports 
on an event without reworking them or commenting upon them. This 
is valid for the universal chronicles of Ibn al-Athir (d. 630/1233) and Sibt 
b. al-Jawzi (d. 654/1262) as well as for the local chronicles—a genre that 
has no counterpart on the Frankish side—of Ibn al-Qalanisi (Damascus) 
and Ibn al-ʿAdim (d. 660/1262, Aleppo). In addition, we have biographies 
(e.g. by Baha⁠ʾ al-Din Ibn Shaddad (d. 632/1234)) on Saladin and by Ibn 
ʿAbd al-Zahir (d. 692/1293) on Baybars and Qalawun, dynastic histories 
(e.g. Abu Shama’s (d. 665/1268) Rawdatayn), autobiographies (e.g. by 
ʿUmara al-Yamani (d. 569/1174) and Ibn Munqidh) as well as historical 
geographies (e.g. by Yaqut al-Rumi (d. 626/1229), ʿIzz al-Din Ibn Shaddad 
(d. 684/1285) and al-Idrisi (d. 560/1165)). Of particular value are the epis-
tles that have been preserved in manuscripts or that were inserted into 
narrative sources, especially the letters by the head of Saladin’s chancery, 
al-Qadi al-Fadil (d. 596/1200), and anthologies of poetry that offfer crucial 
insights into the history of mentalities and sometimes also into the back-
ground of specifĳic Frankish-Muslim alliances. Outstanding examples for 
this are Kharidat al-qasr by ʿImad al-Din al-Katib al-Isfahani (d. 597/1201) 
and the Diwan of the Egyptian Wazir Tala⁠ʾiʿ b. Ruzzik (d. 556/1161). The 
chancery sources, such as al-Qalqashandi’s (d. 821/1418) Subh, are crucial 
for understanding the technicalities of treaties. Only these texts reproduce 
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complete texts of Frankish-Muslim treaties and oaths, even though they 
only go back to the second half of the thirteenth century.12
Thus, Arabic sources do not only offfer additional information on cases 
of Frankish-Muslim cooperation, the Muslim perspective on the Crusades 
and insights into Frankish-Muslim ‘daily life’. Rather, they provide most 
crucially the possibility of analysing the history of the Frankish states 
as part of the Syrian history (i.e. al-Sham, the region between the Sinai, 
the Cilician Gate and the Euphrates). This approach allows an outright 
classifĳication of conflicts between Frankish and Muslim rulers as con-
frontations between Christianity and Islam to be avoided. On this basis, 
the present study does not start with the First Crusade, but rather three 
decades earlier as the characteristic constellation of alliances and powers 
that the Franks encountered had come into being around 1070. The study 
focuses on the twelfth century, but includes also the thirteenth century 
for the analysis of Frankish-Muslim treaties’ technicalities. This is because 
the legal instruments that had been developed in the twelfth century to 
resolve conflicts continued to be used in the thirteenth century and were 
to some extent even further developed in this period. The thirteenth cen-
tury is, however, of less interest for the policies of alliances. After the end 
of the Third Crusade (1192) the Frankish states mostly stopped playing 
a major role in the Middle East and became increasingly dependent on 
European support. Consequently, they ceased to be an important alliance 
partner for the Muslim states, except for Antioch’s reliance on Aleppo 
until 1216 and the alliances between the kingdom of Jerusalem and the 
Ayyubid rulers of Syria between 1240 and 1244.
12 On specifĳic source genres, especially for the twelfth century, cf. Ahmad, Notes. Further 
overviews cf. Cahen, Syrie, 1–104; Cahen, Editions; Elisséefff, Nūr ad-Dīn, I, 1–85; Gottschalk, 
Al-Kāmil, 2–19; Hartmann, An-Nāṣir, 12–60; Schregle, Sultanin, 9–27; Little, Introduction. 
On Western sources cf. Mayer, Bibliographie, 44–61; Knoch, Studien; Morgan, Chronicle; 
Morgan, Rothelin.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYRIAN SYSTEM OF 
AUTONOMOUS LORDSHIPS (C. 1070–1099)
The Frankish acquisition of territory during the First Crusade and sub-
sequent years unquestionably marks an important turning-point in the 
history of the Middle East. The Crusaders transplanted legal, administra-
tive, ethical and cultural models and principles into alien surround ings, 
which had hitherto been characterised by quite other structural elements 
and mentalities. Nevertheless, the formation of the Crusader states did 
not lead to a revolutionary change in the structure of Syria and northern 
Mesopotamia (al-Jazira) for two reasons. Firstly, the wave which founded 
Frankish lordships and states did not take place in a polity unifĳied legally, 
ethnically or confessionally, but in an area of extreme diversity. It was to 
be of crucial signifĳicance for the history of the Frankish states that lead-
ers of Turkish origin took power in the great cities of Syria and north-
ern Mesopotamia during the three decades preceding the First Crusade. 
None of those petty Turkish lordships was capable of sustaining the role 
of a major power for long, in contrast to the previous period where the 
Byzantine Empire and Egypt had played this role. In lieu of this, there 
developed a system of Syrian states (or autonomous lordships), which was 
marked by the interest of the separate rulers in maintaining their power. 
This system functioned through the particular structure of rivalries and 
alliances, which had become well entrenched and which also continued 
to exist after 1098–99. Secondly, the formation of the Frankish lordships 
resembled that of their Turkish counterparts in that they were not accom-
panied by a widespread movement of colonization. In the countryside, 
neither Turks nor Franks altered the structure of settlement and organiza-
tion of the land to any signifĳicant extent, while occasionally altering them 
in the towns to various degrees.
The establishment of the Franks in the Middle East thus did not entail 
a complete reorganization of the region, but for the most part took place 
within existing structures, as with the Turks. The characteristics of the 
pre-existing Syrian system of autonomous lordships were crucial for the 
inter-state relations that developed after 1098–99. The present work there-
fore does not begin with the year 1098, 1099 or 1100, but includes the last 
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three decades of the eleventh century. The following two sections will 
highlight the development of the Syrian system of autonomous lordships 
with its special characteristics as well as the policy of the Crusaders in 
regard to alliances and treaties up to 1099 and a consideration of their 
motives. The resultant fĳindings will be of fundamental signifĳicance for 
understanding Frankish-Muslim relations in Syria after the acquisition of 
territories by the Crusaders.
The System of Autonomous Lordships before the 
First Crusade (c. 1070–1099)
In the introduction to his translation of the chronicle of Ibn al-Qalanisi, 
Gibb distinguishes the six diffferent powers which competed for lordship 
and territory directly before the coming of the First Crusade.1 He identifĳies 
long-established rulers, i.e. (1) the Shiite Fatimid dynasty, which had ruled 
Egypt since 969 and (2) local amirs, judges (qadis) and tribal shaykhs of 
Arab descent. These were distinct from groups of recent arrivals in Syria, 
most importantly (3) the Seljuk princes from Mesopotamia, which had 
been under Seljuk control from 1055, who started to penetrate Syria, 
(4) the Turkish amirs coming to Syria as tribal chiefs or Seljuk governors 
and seeking to establish or extend autonomous rule and (5) independent 
Turcoman tribes, who came to Syria in the last third of the eleventh cen-
tury in the course of the Turkish migration westwards.2 Finally, the sixth 
power was the rural, urban and nomadic population of Syria itself, hav-
ing greater or less political capacity. In towns, this population was orga-
nized in the corporations, the militia (ahdath) and the magistrates, who 
participated in the newly awakened urban autonomy movement.3 In the 
countryside, the population was organized in tribes and self-contained 
confessional communities. This variety of antagonistic actors stands at the 
end of a process marked by the regionalization and particularization of 
the conditions of lordship in the Middle East. 
The traditional partition of Syria into an Egyptian-dominated and a 
Byzantine-dominated sphere had come to an end during the 1060s in 
consequence of the struggle for power within Egypt and the weakness 
1 Gibb, Damascus Chronicle, 14–32.
2 Cahen, Pénétration.
3 Ashtor-Strauss, Administration; Cahen, Mouvements; Havemann, Institutionen.
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of the Byzantine Empire due to the victorious advance of the Seljuks.4 
This provided a basis in Syria for a revival of the old movement for urban 
autonomy. In almost all the great cities the governors, installed by alien 
lords, were increasingly involved in struggles for supremacy. In some 
cases, such as Tyre and Tripoli, dynasties of local qadis even superseded 
the governors. Furthermore, individual governors and amirs strove to 
make themselves independent. It is of particular signifĳicance, however, 
that the newly awakened particularism and the lack of a strong authority 
made it possible for individual Seljuk rulers and Turcoman groups, who 
penetrated Syria as part of the Seljuk armies or on their own initiative, to 
establish lordships. With them a new external actor appeared in Syria.
The highly sensitive network of relationships and the political landscape 
in Syria towards the end of the eleventh century were shaped by diffferent 
factors, such as shifting coalitions, the opportunistic loyalties of the local 
dynasties and confessional communities, as well as the ambitions of tribal 
leaders and Seljuk commanders to establish their own spheres of rule. 
In the course of the First Crusade, it was not a case of the West clashing 
with the East or faith clashing with infĳidelity in two blocs, as described in 
the Frankish chronicles. The penetrat ion of the Crusaders merely added 
a further factor to the game of the antagonistic powers in Syria. The Cru-
saders possessed no new political or military qualities in the eyes of Ori-
ental contemporaries. The question of their integration in the previously 
existing structures, that is the question of confrontation and coexistence, 
had challenged the Turks just as it did the Franks two or three decades 
earlier. To analyse the relation ship of the Frankish states in Syria with the 
Islamic world, it is fĳirst necessary to consider the constellation of pow-
ers which the Crusaders encountered in 1097–98. This constellation had 
developed in four main phases: The beginning of Fatimid-Turkish antago-
nism (1070–79), the antagonism between northern and southern Syria and 
the beginning of the fragmentation of power in central Syria (1079–85), 
the dissolution of the great lordships in northern Syria through Sultan 
Malikshah and Fatimid recuperation in the south (1085–92) and fĳinally 
Aleppo and Damascus under rival Seljuk princes: the formation of coali-
tions up to the arrival of the First Crusade in Syria (1092–98).
4 Wiet, Egypt, 239–45; Wüstenfeld, Geschichte, 254fff.; Mājid, Ẓuhūr, 369–91; Cahen, 
Pénétration, 30–4; Vismara, Bisanzio, 46–7; Hamdani, Relations; Zakkar, Emirate, 129–183; 
Salibi, Syria, 84–121.
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The Turcoman chief Atsiz b. Abaq succeeded in establishing himself 
in Palestine at the beginning of the 1070s. In this he was favoured by the 
anarchic conditions in Egypt and southern Syria and the decline of the 
Fatimid power in Palestine and southern Syria, exemplifĳied in the rise 
of local powers in Tyre and Tripoli. By 1074 Atsiz was able to subdue the 
whole of Palestine as far as Ascalon and in 1076 he even succeeded after 
fĳive years of warfare in entering Damascus, which until then had remained 
under Fatimid sovereignty.5 After treaties with Tyre and Tripoli had given 
him access to the markets of both these harbour towns, he felt strong 
enough to attack Egypt by the end of 1076.
This enterprise and its consequences are of interest for the history of 
the Crusader states for two reasons. First, religious propaganda clearly 
accompanied the Fatimid defensive struggle against the troops of Atsiz. 
The Egyptian wazir recruited as warriors 3,000 pilgrims, who were on 
their way to the Hijaz at the time of the invasion, with the argument that 
‘to repulse this enemy is better than the pilgrimage’. During the fĳighting, 
fugitives assembled for mourning rituals, supplications and Quran recita-
tions in the mosques in accordance with the Fatimid caliph’s command, 
‘Seek refuge with God Most High and flee unto Him; stay in the Friday 
mosques and other mosques; fast, pray and abstain from alcohol and 
forbidden things.’6 In other words, defence against the Muslim (but not 
Shiite) intruders was plausibly propagated not only as an Ismaili jihad, 
but even as being better than one of the fĳive Islamic duties enjoined in 
the Quran. Second, Palestine immediately revolted against Atsiz after his 
defeat in Egypt. Of special importance was the rebellion of Jerusalem 
since the Turcomans had deposited their families and moveable posses-
sions there. The people of Jerusalem divided up the Turcomans’ women 
among themselves and sold their full-grown sons into slavery. Thereupon 
Atsiz marched on the city with his last levies and held a gruesome court 
of criminal justice. Thousands of men fell victim to the victors’ massacre. 
Only those who had fled to the Holy Places of Islam were spared against 
the payment of a heavy ransom. A little later, the entire population of 
Gaza was also slaughtered. The parallel to the subsequent relationship 
between the Crusader states and their Islamic neighbours is obvious. The 
conflict between Atsiz and the Fatimids shows clearly that the defensive 
5 Ibn Ẓāfĳir, 76; Ibn Muyassar, 42–3; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 95–6, 108–9; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 
99–100; al-Maqrīzī, Ittiʿāẓ, II, 315.
6 Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī, ed. Sevim, 182.
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struggle of the established dynasties, particularly of the Shiites against the 
Turcomans, was conducted under religious auspices and was accompa-
nied by excesses in no way inferior to those which marked the coming of 
the Crusaders. The appearance of the Franks thus brought merely a new 
power into play, but no other quality.
After the reduction of Egyptian influence in southern Syria, the emer-
gence of city-states on the coast and the establishment of Turcoman lord-
ships from 1070 onwards, two further components developed in the years 
from 1079 to 1085 which were to stamp the political history of Syria for 
decades: fĳirst, the antagonism between a strong Damascus and the cities 
of northern Syria (Aleppo with its catchment area in northern Mesopota-
mia and Antioch with its hinterland of Cilicia) and second, the regional-
ization of political rule in central Syria. The revival of the rivalry between 
Damascus on the one side and Aleppo and Antioch on the other is linked 
with the formation of Tutush’s power in Syria. Tutush’s brother, the Seljuk 
Sultan Malikshah (1072–92), had sent him to Syria in response to a call 
for help from one of the parties contending for power in Aleppo.7 Tutush, 
however, could not take Aleppo in 1079, but a pressing appeal reached 
him from Atsiz for support in the south against the Fatimids. Tutush has-
tened to Damascus, procured the execution of Atsiz and from the end of 
1079 found himself in secure possession of the city.8 Tutush’s principal 
aim in the subsequent period was to control Aleppo, the second great cen-
tre of Syria and the springboard to the Seljuk heartlands in Mesopotamia. 
When, directly after his success in the south, he laid waste to the regions 
south-west of Aleppo and even briefly besieged the city, the townspeople 
turned to the Arab governor of Mosul, Muslim b. Quraysh. Muslim there-
upon took possession of Aleppo in June 1080 when the Aleppine militia 
under their chief Ibn al-Hutayti surrendered it to him.9
The subsequent conflict between Muslim b. Quraysh and Tutush is of 
importance for the later history of the Crusader states because it permit-
ted the survival of diffferent petty powers that were able to shift their alle-
giance between the two adversaries. Of outstanding signifĳicance are the 
lordships of Shayzar and Hims. In 1081 ʿAli b. Muqallid b. Munqidh, one of 
the most in fluential men in Aleppo before it lost its independence in 1080, 
succeeded in purchasing the fortress of Shayzar from the Greek Orthodox 
7 Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Bughya, 46–7.
8 Ibn ʿAsākir, Wulāt, 18–19; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 112; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 111; Ibn Muyassar, 
46; al-ʿAẓīmī, 362.
9 Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 67–70, 73–5.
© 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV, ISBN 978-90-04-24857-1
12 chapter one
bishop of al-Bara after several months of siege.10 About the same time 
the Turcoman Khalaf b. Mulaʿib was able to establish himself in Hims 
in central Syria.11 Muslim b. Quraysh did not succeed in bringing these 
two new lordships under his jurisdiction, unlike other minor Turcoman 
or Arab lordships or city-states. On the contrary, his struggles with Tutush 
compelled him to seek a settlement with them in July 1082. In 1083, he 
even ceded Rafaniyya and Salamiyya to Khalaf b. Mulaʿib in a peace treaty 
(sulh), so that Khalaf could protect his rear against Tutush in his northern 
operations.12
Alongside the existence of diffferent petty Turcoman and Arab lord-
ships in central Syria, there developed during the period of Muslim b. 
Quraysh’s rule a second feature of the constellation of powers which was 
to be efffective in the following decades. This was the political isolation of 
Aleppo, resulting from the endeavours of various Seljuk and Turkish rul-
ers in Damascus, Anatolia or Mesopotamia to seize the town. Egypt alone 
was an ally for the rulers of Aleppo and two instances of contact between 
Aleppo and Egypt appeared already under Muslim b. Quraysh. In 1083, 
Muslim’s plan for the capture of Damascus miscarried as the promised 
Egyptian reinforcements failed to appear. In 1083–84 when Sultan Malik-
shah besieged him in Amid/Diyar Bakr, he even offfered the Fatimids rec-
ognition of Egyptian suzerainty if they would help him against the sultan. 
This step proved to be fruitless only because the sultan had to reach rec-
onciliation with his opponent due to a revolt in eastern Iran, Khurasan.13 
The strong reservations of Muslim rulers and governors in northern Syria 
regarding all Seljuk operations and their occasional approaches to Egypt 
continued beyond the time of Muslim b. Quraysh as essential factors 
in the mutual relationships of the individual rulers in Syria. After the 
establish ment of the Crusader states, the ruler of Aleppo’s fear that the 
sultan threatened his independence was to be of decisive signifĳicance for 
the lack of a united Islamic resistance against the Franks.
The clashes between strong power complexes in northern Syria and 
the revival of Egyptian influence on the coast and in central Syria marked 
the period from 1085 to 1092. Yet, the construction of great lordships and 
10 Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 67–70, 77–8.
11  Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 79.
12  Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī, ed. Sevim, 209.
13  Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī, ed. Sevim, 236; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 84–6. In 1083 there was also a 
rapprochement between Tutush and the Fatimids which was to be sealed by a betrothal. 
This plan was criticized, and perhaps prevented, by the qadi of Tripoli.
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leading powers was prevented and encroachment on Syria was denied to 
external rulers. The cause of this was that Sultan Malikshah, who won the 
struggle over power in Aleppo through his campaign of 1086, pursued with 
his Wazir Nizam al-Mulk a policy of decentralization of power in Syria. 
This policy aimed at the establishment of a balance of power between 
the Euphrates and Sinai. Equilibrium between lordships of approximately 
equal strength, subordinate to Malikshah, should provide for the safe-
guarding of the sultan’s suzerainty over Syria, while preventing further 
expansion by his brother Tutush.
The background for the sultan’s intervention in northern Syria was a 
conflict that broke out in the fĳirst half of 1085 between Muslim b. Quraysh 
of Aleppo and the Anatolian Seljuk ruler Sulayman b. Qutulmush. Sulay-
man had occupied Antioch in December 1084, hitherto subject to the Byz-
antine Philaretes.14 In June 1085, he defeated and killed Muslim b. Quraysh, 
but in spite of his success Sulayman was in no position to take possession 
of Aleppo.15 Ibn al-Hutayti, the leader of the city militia, refused him entry, 
calling on Sultan Malikshah and even Tutush of Damascus for help as the 
sultan’s coming was delayed. Only in June 1086 did Sulayman and Tutush 
meet south of Aleppo. Sulayman lost the battle and did not survive the 
fĳight.16 Tutush, however, was no more successful than his fallen adversary 
in gaining complete possession of Aleppo. Even after Tutush had made his 
entry into the city through a surprise attack and had induced the militia 
to surrender, the commander of the citadel, in accordance with an ear-
lier oath, would only hand over the fortifĳication to the sultan himself.17 
Tutush had to withdraw to Damascus in the fĳirst half of August before the 
vanguard of the army of his brother, the sultan.
After the campaign of the Seljuk sultan, who entered Aleppo on 
3 December 1086 and marched into Antioch before his return to Iraq, a 
completely altered constellation of powers presented itself between the 
Euphrates and the Mediterranean Sea. Malikshah had handed over all 
terri tories on the Euphrates from Saruj and Harran in the north to the 
River Khabur in the east to the son of Muslim b. Quraysh.18 The sultan 
reduced the rule of the Byzantine Philaretes to Marash after the latter 
14 According to al-ʿAẓīmī, 365, Sulayman took the citadel only in January 1085. The pre-
vious history is marked by clear diffferences among the chronicles.
15 Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 88–92; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 139–141.
16 Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 134; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 97.
17 Al-ʿAẓīmī, 366; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 147–8; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 98–9.
18 Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 148; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 100–1.
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had submitted and accepted conversion to Islam.19 Truly loyal governors 
were appointed to Antioch, Aleppo and Edessa (al-Ruha). The sultan 
considerably reduced the lordship of the Banu Munqidh of Shayzar on 
the Orontes, but allowed it to survive.20 Finally, extensive territories on the 
Euphrates around Qalʿat Jaʿbar were handed over to Salim b. Malik, the 
commandant of the citadel of Aleppo, in return for the surrender of his 
fortress.21 The newly decentralized division of powers prevented any 
encroach ment by Tutush on Mesopotamia during the sultan’s lifetime 
and remained the most important feature of the political landscape of 
northern Syria beyond the First Crusade. 
At the same time, southern Syria witnessed developments which were 
of signifĳicance for the history of the Frankish states following the First 
Crusade. At this point, nothing remained of earlier Fatimid rule over the 
region apart from a coastal strip with probably Caesarea as its most north-
erly point. The qadis of Tyre and Tripoli had been autonomous since the 
beginning of the 1070s. Whether they still recognized at least a de jure 
Egyptian suzerainty is not altogether clear. All the remaining territories 
had gradually come under Tutush’s rule, amongst them the Palestinian 
hill-country with Jerusalem, which Tutush had granted to the Turcoman 
Amir Artuq in iqtaʿ.22 From 1087, however, the situation in Egypt had been 
consolidated to the point that the Wazir Badr al-Jamali could contemplate 
new offfensives in Syria. Fatimid armies conquered the Palestinian coast 
and besieged Damascus with the result that Tutush had to seek support 
even in Aleppo and Edessa.23 His situation became even more delicate 
when in 1089 an Egyptian army not only captured Acre, Sidon and Jubayl 
but also regained Tyre after some two decades of independence. There-
upon Khalaf b. Mulaʿib of Hims and Famiya also placed himself under 
Fatimid suzerainty. Tutush had to ask the northern Syrian governors 
19 Barhebraeus, 231.
20 Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 149–150; Ibn al-Athīr, Bāhir, 8.
21 Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 149–150; Ibn al-Athīr, Bāhir, 8; Barhebraeus, 231; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, 
Zubda, II, 101; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Bughya, 200–3. Salim was the cousin of Muslim b. Quraysh.
22 ʿIzz al-Dīn b. Shaddād, Aʿlāq (Lubnān), 98–99, 102. Beirut and Sidon appear to 
have been in Tutush’s possession since 471/1078–79. In 472/1079–80 the Egyptians briefly 
regained Sidon. Tutush took Baʿlabakk in the summer of 476/1083, after the withdrawal 
of Muslim b. Quraysh from Damascus. It was under Fatimid suzerainty. Cf. ʿIzz al-Dīn b. 
Shaddād, Aʿlāq (Lubnān), 44–5; Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī, ed. Sevim, 200; Ibn Taghrībirdī, V, 115–6.
23 According to Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 145, an Egyptian army had already encircled 
Damascus in Rabiʿ I 478/1085.
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once more for help.24 Khalaf ’s contacts with the Fatimids and his raids 
against the rulers in central Syria had become so threatening that the sul-
tan ordered Tutush to join with the northern Syrian governors to end the 
rule of Khalaf over Hims and Famiya.
During the subsequent events, however, the political structure cre-
ated by Malikshah in the north proved itself to be an efffective means 
against Tutush’s endeavours to extend his power. After the capture of 
Hims, Aqsunqur of Aleppo delivered the city to Tutush only on the sul-
tan’s express instructions. However, he handed over Famiya to the amir of 
Shayzar, although he had been at war with him in the previous year.25 The 
governors of Aleppo and Edessa frustrated the almost certain capture of 
Tripoli by Tutush a year later. They deserted the besieging army after the 
ruler of the city, the Qadi Jalal al-Mulk, had bribed them so that they rec-
ognized his probably forged diploma of appointment to Tripoli from the 
sultan. Arguing that an attack on the city would imply rebellion against 
the sultan, the two governors abandoned Tutush who was forced to give 
up his project.26
The conflict between the various claimants to the succession of Sultan 
Malikshah, who died in 1092, marked the fourth and fĳinal phase from 
1092 to 1098. Tutush fĳinally fell victim to this conflict in 1095, following 
Aqsunqur of Aleppo and Buzan of Edessa, and his sons started to dispute 
for supremacy. This phase offfers a confusing oscillogram of ever-varying 
coalitions between individual lordships as old lordships survived and new 
autonomous petty lordships developed. Since the structure of the Syrian 
system of autonomous lordships assumed during this phase a form current 
until the fĳirst decade of the twelfth century, the development between 
1092 and 1098 requires a fuller presentation.
On the death of Malikshah in 1092, Tutush had succeeded his brother as 
sultan. Accompanied by the north Syrian governors, who complied with 
him willy-nilly since Malikshah’s sons were still minors, he had himself 
proclaimed sultan in February 1093 at al-Rahba on the Euphrates, half-
way to Baghdad. However, as his followers Aqsunqur and Buzan deserted 
with their troops in Persia to Berkyaruq, one of Malikshah’s sons on whose 
24 Al-ʿAẓīmī, 367–8; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 120; Ibn Muyassar, 50; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 176, 
202–3; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 105–6; al-Maqrīzī, Ittiʿāẓ, II, 326; Ibn Taghrībirdī, V, 128; 
ʿIzz al-Dīn b. Shaddād, Aʿlāq (Lubnān), 165–6. Tutush had obviously subdued the coastal 
towns. Al-ʿAzimi mentions Beirut as having been conquered in 1089.
25 Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 105–6; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 408. Cf. Derenbourg, Ousâma, 28. 
26 Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 203; ʿIzz al-Dīn b. Shaddād, Aʿlāq (Lubnān), 84; Ibn Taghrībirdī, 
V, 132–3.
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succession the Iranian Seljuks were agreed, Tutush was forced to give up 
all his conquests and to flee to Damascus.27 His revenge was not slow 
in coming. In 1094, Tutush defeated the partisans of his rival Berkyaruq 
near Aleppo, strengthened only by Bedouins and the governor of Antioch, 
Yaghisiyan who alone remained faithful to him.28 Aqsunqur and Buzan 
paid for their treachery by death. Just nine months later, however, on 
26 February 1095, Tutush encountered Berkyaruq’s army near present-day 
Tehran where he was defeated and killed.29
For half a century, until 1154, no lordship of comparable strength to 
Tutush’s realms was to arise. The territories which Tutush had gathered 
between 1092 and 1095 fell apart once again after his death into the inde-
pendent and rival power centres which had already existed before 1094–95, 
before 1086 and partly even before the Turkish invasions. The disputes 
between the sons of Tutush were decisive for this. Ridwan b. Tutush was 
the fĳirst to return to Syria after his father’s death and he took possession of 
Aleppo. Shortly afterwards his Atabeg Janah al-Dawla30 and his younger 
brother Duqaq reached Aleppo, though Duqaq quickly accepted an invita-
tion from his father’s governor in Damascus, where he made himself inde-
pendent. The sons of Tutush required a year to consolidate their power. 
Ridwan in Aleppo procured the murder of two of his younger brothers 
and rivals. Duqaq in Damascus similarly disposed of the governor whose 
invitation had made possible his access to power. The arrival of Atabeg 
Tughtegin, already a man of trust under Tutush, strengthened Duqaq. The 
fraternal struggle which thereafter broke out between Ridwan and Duqaq 
dominated the political life of Syria up to the time when the fĳirst Crusad-
ers arrived.31
The fĳirst phase of the dispute saw all the local lords of northern Syria, 
except Yaghisiyan of Antioch and some Arab tribal chiefs, on Ridwan’s 
side. Ridwan and his retainer Sukman b. Artuq, to whom he had surren-
dered Saruj after initial disputes, succeeded in enlarging their posses-
sions, specifĳically Tall Bashir (the Turbessel of the Crusaders), Manbij, 
27 Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 220–2; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 122–4.
28 Al-ʿAẓīmī, 370; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 126–7; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 232–5; Ibn al-Athīr, 
Bāhir, 15; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 110–3.
29 Ibn al-Qalānisī, 129–30; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 244–5; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 119.
30 Atabeg was the title of a Turkish offfĳicer to whom the tutoring and upbringing of a 
prince was entrusted. An atabeg often became the husband of the prince’s mother, which 
might even happen during the lifetime of the prince’s father. Janah al-Dawla was the step-
father and atabeg of Ridwan, as Tughtegin was to Duqaq.
31 Gibb, Chronicle, 129–32; Salibi, Syria and in addition Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Bughya, 138–41.
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Buzaʿa and Marra/Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman became theirs.32 None of the fur-
ther operations, however, led to an efffective resolution of the conflict 
between Tutush’s sons. Neither Ridwan’s unsuccessful siege of Damascus, 
nor his subsequent confĳinement by the Damascenes in Jerusalem, which 
his partisan Sukman b. Artuq controlled, nor the victory of the north Syr-
ian allies over Duqaq and Yaghisiyan at Qinnasrin to the south of Aleppo 
in the year 1097 were efffective. The reversal of alliances of 1097 was the 
turning-point to the second phase of the conflicts. A profound alienation 
developed in the summer of that year between Ridwan and his Atabeg 
Janah al-Dawla and the atabeg fled in fear for his life with his wife, Rid-
wan’s mother, to Hims, where he made himself independent of Aleppo.33 
That gave Yaghisiyan of Antioch the opportunity to change front and to 
go over to Ridwan, where he took the place of the fugitive Janah al-Dawla. 
Ridwan provided him with a position similar to that of the atabeg and his 
marriage with the daughter of Yaghisiyan confĳirmed the alliance.34
In order to isolate Duqaq in Damascus, Ridwan undertook an even 
more risky move. Like Muslim b. Quraysh and Khalaf b. Mulaʿib before 
him he sought an approach to Egypt. On 28 August 1097, the names of 
the Shiite Fatimid Caliph al-Mustaʿli (487–95/1094–1101) and of his Wazir 
al-Afdal were for the fĳirst time mentioned in the Friday prayer in Aleppo 
before that of Ridwan. This subordination of the Sunni Ridwan to the 
suzerainty of the Ismaili Shiite caliph, hoping (admittedly in vain) for 
rich gifts and armed help against Damascus, had, however, to be with-
drawn after a month under pressure from Ridwan’s indignant allies, Suk-
man and Yaghisiyan.35 As the north Syrian allies mustered their armies 
before Shayzar for an operation against Hims a little later, news reached 
them of the appearance of the fĳirst Crusader troops. Ridwan, Sukman and 
Yaghisiyan could not agree on common action and returned hastily to the 
territories they held.36
The analysis of the phases of development and characteristics of the 
Syrian system of autonomous lordships and constellations of alliances 
32 Main sources are Ibn al-Qalānisī, 131–3; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 123–7.
33 Ibn al-Qalānisī, 133; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 255; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 127.
34 Al-ʿAẓīmī, 372; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 127; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 133.
35 The ʿAbbasid khutba had been the rule in Aleppo since 1070 (Al-ʿAẓīmī, 372; Ibn 
al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 127–9; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 133). The Fatimid khutba was introduced in 
Shayzar in 1097. Ibn Muyassar, 64, believed that Ridwan proposed this. It is probably cor-
rect that, as most other sources suggest, an Egyptian delegation called on him to recognize 
the suzerainty of the Caliph al-Mustaʿli, who had held offfĳice since 1095.
36 Ibn al-Qalānisī, 133; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 129.
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between c. 1070 and 1098 permits the establishment of the following 
three points. Firstly, the periods of weakness of the Byzantine and Fatimid 
Empires had resulted in phases in which the relationships of rulers were 
increasingly regionalized and particularized. A common Islamic con-
sciousness was not recognized in view of the variety of antagonistic Egyp-
tian, Arab, Turcoman and Seljuk claims to power. On the contrary, the 
Fatimid defence of Egypt against the Turcomans was even propagated as a 
jihad. Secondly, none of the rival powers was able to assume the hegemony 
that Byzantium and Egypt had held earlier. In consequence, the disputes 
about supremacy in the north and the policy of ‘divide and rule’ enforced 
by Sultan Malikshah in 1086 permitted the survival of the local lordships 
which arose after 1070. In addition, it was not possible for anyone from 
1095 at the latest to control the Turkish amirs originally appointed as gov-
ernors. This made it possible for them to emerge as independent lords of 
cities de facto if not de jure. Thirdly, the dominant theme of the conflict 
within Syria was the antagonism between Damascus and Aleppo, which 
since 1095 had been fought in the form of a Seljuk succession-struggle. 
All the Turkish amirs and governors who had obtained possession of the 
most important cities since 1076 became partisans. On the other hand, 
the Arab local lords in central Syria, on the coast and the Euphrates, and 
likewise Fatimid Egypt acted in all the disputes largely as neutrals. Besides 
a few schemes for alliances, they did not directly intervene in the Turkish 
rivalries.
The important Syrian rulers and their alliance policies in 1097 were as 
follows: The most powerful north Syrian city-lords, Ridwan of Aleppo and 
Yaghisiyan of Antioch, were in 1097 in alliance with Sukman b. Artuq of 
Saruj and Jerusalem against Duqaq of Damascus and Janah al-Dawla of 
Hims. The north had a majority of Shiites, Antioch of Christians, the Sunnis 
predominated in the south and Arabs ruled the central Syrian lordships. 
Apart from Shayzar and Tripoli, which maintained friendly relations with 
each other, two further lordships existed in 1097, Famiya and Jabala. Khalaf 
b. Mulaʿib had become the Egyptian governor of Famiya in 1096 after the 
death of Tutush and had immediately made himself independent.37 Jabala 
had achieved independence from Tripoli under the Ra⁠ʾis (headman) Ibn 
Sulayha shortly before the arrival of the Crusaders.38 These local lords of 
central Syria maintained as far as possible neutrality in the Turkish and 
37 Ibn Muyassar, 63; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 408; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 122.
38 Ibn al-Qalānisī, 139; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 310–2.
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Seljuk disputes. The same applied to the Arab lordship of Qalʿat Jaʿbar on 
the Euphrates and to the Armenian Toros, who had taken power in Edessa 
after the death of Tutush. The coastline south of Jubayl39 was under Egyp-
tian suzerainty. Fatimid rule in the formerly independent port-cities was, 
however, not fĳirmly established. Tyre in particular, which had only been 
reconquered in July 1093 from a rebellious governor,40 remained insecure. 
Already in February–March 1097, a Fatimid army had again to reconquer 
it as the new governor had yet again made himself independent of Cairo.41 
After a period of internal disturbances in 1094, due to the deaths of both 
wazir and caliph, Egypt resumed with this action a more active Syrian 
policy and endeavoured to use the quarrels among the Seljuks to extend 
the Fatimid position in Syria. In reality, the Fatimid governors appear 
to have concluded treaties largely at their own discretion, both with the 
Turks before 1099 and also with the Franks after the First Crusade. There 
is hardly any fĳirm information about the extent and position of the second 
great lordship in Palestine, Jerusalem. Turkish amirs of the Artuqid fam-
ily held it as an iqtaʿ subordinate to Damascus since the days of Tutush. 
However, since Sukman b. Artuq was in alliance with Ridwan of Aleppo 
in 1097, Jerusalem must have been in reality independent.
The picture as outlined encompasses solely the ruling centres of trans-
regional political importance. The extent of urban control over rural dis-
tricts and the position of the alien Turkish rulers vis-à-vis the native urban 
population depended entirely on the wavering power of the city-lords 
and the accessibility of the respective territories. It is especially worthy 
of notice for Aleppo and Damascus that their lords had to reckon in their 
policies with the opposition of the magistrates and the city militia and 
furthermore, in Aleppo, the added opposition of the confessional groups. 
The inconsistency and vagueness of the chronicles and geographical 
works does not allow defĳinite statements, even about important regional 
centres such as Hamah or Tiberias.42 From local chronicles, the autobiog-
raphy of Usama b. Munqidh and Western sources further minor lords are 
known at least by name. These include, for example, the amir families of 
Marda and Buhtur of the Lebanese Gharb, the Banu Muhriz of Qadmus, 
39 William of Tyre, VII, XXI, 310, mentions the place as belonging to Tripoli, although 
it was taken by Egypt in 1089.
40 Ibn al-Qalānisī, 124–5; Ibn Muyassar, 51.
41 Ibn al-Qalānisī, 133–4; Ibn Muyassar, 64.
42 Cahen, Syrie, 38–9. Local Damascenes chronicles, such as the one by Ibn al-Qalānisī, 
also have little information about events beyond the authors’ hometown.
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the lords of castles whom the Franks encountered in central Syria and 
the amir ʿAmrun of Kahf in north Palestine and east of Jordan, called ‘the 
great countryman’ (grossus rusticus) by the Franks.43 As well as Bedouin 
groups, self-contained settled religious minorities were of particular sig-
nifĳicance as treaty partners or opponents; the Druze in Jabal Summaq and 
southern Lebanon, Shiite Nusayris in Jabal Bahra and Christian minori-
ties such as the Maronites in northern Lebanon.44 The regionalization 
of political power since the Turkish invasions allowed these groupings 
to form more or less independent petty lordships in their regions. They 
did not always succeed in completely freeing themselves from the local 
city-lords; their permanent pressure for autonomy is, however, a constant 
factor in the development of political relations among Syrian states. The 
most signifĳicant of these groups, were the Nizari Ismailis (‘Assasins’ or 
‘Batiniyya’), which had split offf in 1094 from the Egyptian Fatimids and 
were attempting to establish a foothold in Syria at the same time as the 
Crusaders. Although they fĳirst succeeded in founding a lasting complex 
of lordships in the 1130s, they were already able in the fĳirst decade of the 
century to win over parts of the Shiite population of northern Syria, under 
the protection of Ridwan, through the operation of agents from a mission-
ary and propaganda base in Aleppo. One of their fĳirst centres was Sarmin, 
where such a base continued to exist until the last third of the thirteenth 
century.45 The temporary rule of the Franks over Sarmin, which repeat-
edly changed its possessor in the time of Ridwan, appears not to have 
disturbed the continuing presence of the Nizaris.
Frankish-Muslim Alliances and Treaties during the 
First Crusade (1097–99)
On account of the complex political situation in Syria in 1098, the Franks 
did not confront an Islamic bloc in Syria, but an abundance of rival lord-
ships under amirs and rulers of diffferent ethnic and religious afffĳiliations. 
At this point, it must be asked who the Crusaders actually were, what aims 
they pursued and how the relations of the Crusaders with the Muslim 
43 Usāma b. Munqidh, Iʿtibār, 87; Albert of Aix, VII, XVII–XVIII, 518–9.
44 In 1099 Maronites advised the Franks to take the coastal route to Jerusalem. Nothing 
is known of the internal organization of the Maronites in this period. On the Maronites 
and the Crusades cf. Salibi, Buḥturids; Salibi, Maronites.
45 Ibn Shiḥna, 164; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 151.
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rulers of Syria were formed. Although the First Crusade is unusually well 
documented in primary sources and its historical background has been 
thoroughly discussed, there are still difffĳiculties in defĳining the actual goal 
of the Crusades. This rests to some extent in the fact that the numerous 
sources which provide information on the Councils of Piacenza and Cler-
mont in 1095, on the preaching of the Crusade in the year 1096 and on the 
various expeditions to Asia Minor were all recorded after, sometimes con-
siderably after, the events which they report. In every case we have thus to 
deal with interpretation through hind sight. Yet, the difffĳiculties in defĳining 
the actual goal of the Crusades rest also in the fact that completely difffer-
ent groups undertook the First Crusade.
The Crusade was not an organized campaign under unopposed mili-
tary or ecclesiastical leadership but a movement, supported by individu-
als whose motivations for taking the cross were as varied as their social 
and ethnic ties. The influence of the individual groups participating in 
the Crusade on its actual form, the formulation of its goals, the ways to 
accomplish these goals and on the relationships with the Muslim oppo-
nents difffers to a large extent over the successive phases of the movement 
between 1095 and 1099. By the time the crusading princes wrote to the 
pope from northern Syria on 11 September 1098, after the battles in Asia 
Minor, the capture of Antioch, the victory over the Turkish relieving force 
under Kirbogha and not least the death of the papal legate Adhemar of 
Le Puy on 1 August 1098, their army had other structures and motives from 
those of the people at the Council of Clermont three years before. It was 
also only partially identical with the bands of the People’s Crusade, which 
the Rum Seljuks had already destroyed in October 1096 at Civetot on the 
Sea of Marmara.46 It may thus be asked what goals the Crusaders had at 
the moment they reached the frontier of that region where all their con-
quests were to be restored to the Byzantine Empire in accordance with 
the arrangement with Alexius Comnenus? Furthermore, what knowledge 
did they have of the religious and political situation in Syria? By what cri-
teria was the amorphous mass of the Crusaders structured? Is it possible 
to discover mutually difffering interests and ways of acting and did this 
influence the possible conclusion of treaties with Muslim rulers?
In the past, attempts were made to single out the profĳile of ‘the true 
Crusader’, who set out as an armed pilgrim in the service of the spiritual 
46 Hagenmeyer, Epistulae, 161–5. The remainder of the People’s Crusade under Peter the 
Hermit attached themselves to the princes’ armies (Hagenmeyer, Chronologie, VI, 255).
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authority and without any ambition to rule, a selfless athlete of Christ 
on the way to Jerusalem to free the sepulchre of Christ. Whoever did not 
correspond to this pattern could simply be regarded as a deviant or a false 
pilgrim. Such an interpretation, which is already discernible in sources 
with a strong religious impetus, meets the objection that the motive to 
preach the Crusade, to support it or even to take the way to Syria one-
self, was not based on one and the same religious enthusiasm for all con-
temporaries, as is shown in the chronicle of Raymond of Aguilers.47 The 
necessary premise for a sharp diffferentiation between true and false Cru-
saders would lie in the existence of a clear and generally accepted pro-
gramme for the Crusade. It appears that a programme of this kind—the 
Crusade as an armed pilgrimage to free the Holy Places—was not pre-
sented to the Crusaders from the outset. What was for the Normans and 
Bohemond little more than an extensive conquering expedition, which 
happened to be sustained by religious sentiment, was for a clerical par-
ticipant in the Crusade such as Raymond of Aguilers (or the later editors 
of his Gesta Francorum) an opus Dei, prefĳigured in the Bible and part of 
salvation history.48
What interest groups and conceptions then influenced the First Cru-
sade? For the initiator of the First Crusade, Pope Urban II (1088–99), the 
conquest of the Holy Places was seemingly not a primary objective. His 
summons to take the cross is to be seen in the wider framework of the 
papal endeavours for union between the Roman and Eastern Churches, 
separated by schism since 1054. Urban’s historical achievement lies in his 
having linked together the theory of Holy Church with popular thinking 
about the penitential pilgrimage to acquire religious merit or an indul-
gence for ecclesiastical penance. With the Crusade, the pope brought 
about the synthesis of both elements while also fulfĳilling the Byzantines’ 
request for help in 1095–96. Urban was concerned in the fĳirst place with 
help for the brothers-in-faith in the East, the union of the Churches and 
also support of the Truce of God movement. An ecclesiastical expedition 
to liberate Jerusalem was probably only one of his aims in Clermont. There 
is much evidence that the idea of the liberation of Jerusalem was pushed 
into the foreground only through the momentum and subsequent devel-
opment of the crusading propaganda that Urban had initiated. Although 
in the pope’s view, Jerusalem as the goal of the march was presumably 
47 Raim. Aguil., 137.
48 Rousset, Origines, 134–51.
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subordinate to the actual point of the Crusade, the provision of help for 
Byzantium, the thought of Jerusalem was already implicitly included in 
the planning of the Crusade in regard to the organization of the under-
taking as an armed pilgrimage. Among the masses, where the idea of the 
Crusade was transformed in the years 1095–96 from an initiative by the 
papal curia into an idea supported by mass enthusiasm, and in the pro-
paganda the boundary between the indulgence for ecclesi astical penance 
and the remission of the punishment of temporal sins in the world to 
come (remissio peccatorum) was blurred. As a consequence, the original 
plan for the reconquest of lost Anatolian provinces was changed into a 
campaign of revenge against the heathen. The end of this development 
was for many Crusaders the idea of a just war to drive the enemies of God 
out of the proper seat of Christianity, hallowed by the life of the Saviour 
himself.49
This conception had little in common with Urban’s intentions and 
nothing at all with that of the Byzantine emperor. At the court of Alexius 
Comnenus there was a complete lack of understanding of the mental-
ity of the groups of Crusaders who had been arriving in Constantinople 
since 1096. Alexius had been able to secure the continued existence of the 
Empire in Anatolia since his accession in 1081 through numerous alliances 
with the Turkish amirs of Asia Minor and the Seljuk Sultan Malikshah.50 
His alliance with Qilij Arslan of Konya even survived the Crusade and 
helped him to fend offf the Norman Bohemond of Antioch when the latter 
invaded the Balkans in 1106–7. A pragmatic procedure marked the emper-
or’s policy, rather than the mentality of the crowds of pilgrims coming 
from Europe who had set out to combat the heathen. His request to the 
pope at the Council of Piacenza for help from Western troops thus merely 
signifĳied the emperor’s resumption of the Byzantine tradition of increas-
ing the number and efffectiveness of the imperial troops by contingents of 
foreign soldiers. For his part, Pope Urban at the Council of Clermont in 
1095 had called on the poor as well as the knightly nobility to make the 
expedi tion to the East, perhaps in order to emphasize the pilgrimage char-
acter of the Crusade. However, he had demanded that wealthy Crusaders 
should provide those who could not equip themselves appropriately with 
weapons. In addition to the unforeseen resonance of the preaching of the 
49 Rousset, Origines, 72–87; Hehl, Kirche, 82–89; Russel, Just War.
50 Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 72–86. Vryonis, Decline, 103–117; Zbinden, Ritter, 95–98; 
Cahen, Pénétration, 51–2.
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Crusade, this appeal to the poor contributed to the fact that the Crusaders 
who arrived in Constantinople were considerably diffferent from the sol-
diers whom Alexius awaited. That the crusading movement took a direc-
tion that neither Rome nor Byzantium had wished meant that pope and 
emperor were no longer capable of organizing it. Thus it is necessary to 
ask whether it was possible that Urban II and Alexius Comnenus could 
have influenced the Crusade after the Crusaders had left the region under 
actual Byzantine rule in June 1097.
For the Byzantine side the answer was not difffĳicult. In the winter of 
1096–97 and the following spring months, the Byzantine emperor had 
succeeded in insisting that most of the Frankish leaders arriving in Con-
stantinople should swear homage and fealty to him. In this way, Alexius 
subordinated the princes in the crusading army as vassals. Accordingly, 
at the siege of Nicaea, which the Byzantines and Crusaders carried out 
together, the role of commander clearly fell to the emperor. After its 
success ful conclusion, the position of Alexius was so strong that on this 
occasion he was able to move all the Crusader chiefs (except Bohemond’s 
subordinate Tancred) to accept homage and fealty. In the subsequent 
period, up to the siege of Antioch, the army of the Crusaders included a 
force under Tatikios, which influenced the progress of the enterprise and 
could oversee the observance of the legal relations established between 
Alexius and the Crusaders. However, the Byzantine position no longer 
had any representative with the Crusaders after the departure of the Byz-
antine contingent under Tatikios at the beginning of February 1098. The 
emperor himself turned back while advancing on Antioch when Frank-
ish fugitives informed him in June 1098 of the alleged annihilation of the 
crusading army in Philomelium (Akshehir) by the Turkish relieving force 
under Kirbogha of Mosul.51 Only Raymond of Toulouse unambiguously 
kept to the oath he had sworn to Alexius—possibly more in consequence 
of his enmity to Bohemond than out of a feeling of personal responsibil-
ity to the emperor. Alexius had no success thereafter in influencing the 
course of the campaign and in accompanying it with diplomatic initia-
tives to make it useful to Byzantine external policy. Neither by the prom-
ise of a new auxiliary force, which imperial envoys presented in April 
1099 to the Crusaders outside ʿArqa (while demanding that they should 
await the coming of this force),52 nor through the advocacy of Raymond of 
51 Hagenmeyer, Chronologie, VI, 532 and VII, 305–6.
52 Raim. Aguil., 125–6. Cf. Hagenmeyer, Chronologie, VII, 446–7.
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 Toulouse, could Alexius regain influence among the Crusaders. The deci-
sion to break offf the siege of ʿArqa and to advance ‘under God’s leadership’ 
directly to Jerusalem fell directly against the count’s advice and regardless 
of the emperor’s auxiliaries, as the eyewitness Raymond of Aguilers makes 
credible. Raymond, influenced by Byzantine gifts and anxious about his 
lines of supply, could not make headway against the common opinion, 
which re proached Alexius with continuous deceit.53
With the dissension between Franks and Byzantines, the Crusade had 
developed in another direction than Urban II and Alexius Comnenus 
planned. How ever, the transformation of the papal project was due not 
least to the fact that the position of the supporters of the papal concept 
was anything but dominant in the army, although for diffferent reasons. 
To all appearances, the pope had entrusted the overall management of 
the Crusade to Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy as his deputy and the military 
leadership to Raymond of Toulouse. In fact, Adhemar also played a signifĳi-
cant role as mediator, propagandist and mentor of those fĳighting pilgrims 
who were not of knightly status (as a military-leader he did not stand out 
particularly); but he died as early as 1 August 1098 in Antioch and thereby 
the army lost the leader appointed by the pope.54 The other legates of 
Urban II in the crusading army, Arnulf of Choques and Alexander, did not 
occupy a position as high as Adhemar. As chaplains, they clearly belonged 
to the households of their lords, Robert of Normandy and Stephen of Blois, 
and they had no authority over the Crusaders in general. Until the arrival 
of the new legate in the autumn of 1099, Archbishop Daimbert of Pisa, 
Rome no longer had anyone among the Crusaders to represent its concept 
of the course of the Crusade. Urban could not comply with the request 
of the crusading princes, expressed in their letter of 11 September 1098, 
to place himself at the head of the expedition to Jerusalem.55 The pope 
died on 29 July 1099, having already planned in April to proceed in person 
to the East. If after Adhemar’s death there was anyone at all who could 
still have influenced the Crusade according to Urban’s ideas, the count of 
Toulouse, chosen by the pope in 1095 for the military leadership, was the 
man. Raymond of Toulouse was, however, never in a position to assume 
the role of supreme commander in the army. When the ambitions of the 
Normans from southern Italy to set up their own principality in Antioch 
53 Raim. Aguil., 125–6.
54 Hagenmeyer, Epistulae, 136–7, 141, 164; Gesta Francorum, XXX, 10, p. 389. Cf. Raim. 
Aguil., 84.
55 Hagenmeyer, Epistulae, 164.
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and Cilicia became clear during the march through Anatolia in 1097, it 
was not Raymond, but Godfrey of Bouillon who was the protagonist of the 
anti-Norman party. Even after the departure of important princes such as 
Hugh of Vermandois (who during the advance through Italy had received a 
papal banner of St. Peter, which could have been interpreted as meaning 
a special designation by Urban) and Stephen of Blois, chosen as dominus 
and gubernator, Raymond possessed no paramount position. Certainly at 
the end of December 1098 in Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman he placed himself at 
the head of the pauperes as dux et dominus, who pressed for the continu-
ance of the march to Jerusalem while the princes were discussing the right 
to the possession of Antioch.56 Raymond also endeavoured by means of 
payments, to move the other princes (with the exception of Bohemond) 
to advance.57 However, the count of Toulouse could not assert himself 
thereafter either against the body of the Crusaders or against the other 
princes.
As this survey shows, the pope’s and the emperor’s concepts of the Cru-
sade no longer had any signifĳicance, at the latest from the summer of 1098. 
Of decisive importance for the further management of the project and 
relations with the Muslims was rather the dialectic of interests between 
the two remaining groups of supporters, the body of simple pilgrims 
and the knightly aristocracy, who were not united by a single high com-
mand. The non-combatants, whom the eyewitness Fulcher of Chartres 
already during the siege of Nicaea in 1097 estimates at fĳive-sixths of the 
Crusaders capable of fĳighting, stood rather in the tradition of the pilgrim-
age to Jerusalem. Yet, for the knights, and especially for the princes in 
the army, material interests were at least equally decisive.58 Hence, on 
several occasions after the conquest of Cilicia, open conflict appeared 
between the army leaders who were pursuing competing interests and 
the pauperes or peregrini, as the author of Gesta Francorum called them 
in contrast to the princes.59
1 November, the deadline fĳixed for the southward advance after the 
victory over the Turkish relieving-force outside Antioch in July 1098, had 
passed without the princes making any preparations for departure as they 
were occupied with territorial conquests. At this point, the mass of simple 
pilgrims under the newly installed bishop of al-Bara put Raymond under 
56 Raim. Aguil., 99.
57 Raim. Aguil., 100.
58 Fulcher, Carnot., I, X, 4, 183.
59 For instance Gesta Francorum, XXXIV, 2, p. 412.
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pressure. He should either make himself the leader of the exped ition to 
Jerusalem or the people would demand of him the Holy Lance found 
in Antioch and proceed southwards under God’s leadership.60 Already 
in the fĳirst half of November 1098, when a princely court of arbitration 
sought to settle the quarrel between Raymond and Bohemond over Anti-
och, voices were raised in the army that the place under dispute should 
simply be razed to the ground in order to allow their departure.61 When 
Raymond added a further element to the quarrels with his wish to gar-
rison Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman, which had been captured in the meantime, the 
pauperes demolished the place, thus compelling departure for the south.62 
Before ʿArqa and Tripoli, the count of Toulouse was again unable to assert 
himself against the majority, who were unwilling to defer the march to 
Jerusalem to capture the two places.63
These events make the conflict of interests between the ‘poor pilgrims’ 
and the knightly aristocracy sufffĳiciently clear. Raymond of Aguilers, whose 
Historia Francorum most clearly reflects the standpoint of the simple pil-
grims and clerics, laments that the knights repeatedly set their private 
interest in making conquests above the common goal.64 The chronicler’s 
reproach does not only touch the princes, but the knightly aristocracy in 
general. Already during the blockade of Antioch, which lasted from the 
end of October 1097 to June 1098, the leaders of the individual contingents 
had established their spheres of influence in the surrounding countryside. 
All the princes had incurred quite considerable expenditure in equipping 
their followers and in accordance with the pope’s word in Clermont that 
they might expect also an earthly reward they covered the costs from their 
conquests.65 Among them were the duke of Normandy and the counts of 
Flanders and Blois, wealthy ruling princes, who out of piety or because 
of a difffĳicult political situation in their homelands were induced to take 
the cross. However, the nobles who had decided to use the Crusade to 
establish their own lordships constituted a special group. They took this 
decision either because they held only the rank of non-ruling princes or 
vassals by birth like Bohemond, Tancred and Baldwin, or because their 
60 Raim. Aguil., 99.
61 Gesta Francorum, XXXI, 1–5, pp. 393–7; Raim. Aguil., 93–4.
62 Raim. Aguil., 100. The pressure of the pauperes is partly to be explained by the cata-
strophic lack of provisions.
63 Raim. Aguil., 126–7, 131. According to Albert of Aix, V, XL, 458, the longing to proceed 
to Jerusalem prevented a siege of the town.
64 Raim. Aguil., 48–9.
65 Baldric of Dol, I, IV, 15; Hagenmeyer, Epistulae, 149.
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age and religiosity (like Raymond) or the giving up of their possessions 
for the purpose of going on the Crusade (like Godfrey) compelled them 
to acquire new material resources in the East.66 If the First Crusade did 
not constitute a project of colonization, as the small number of Europeans 
who actually remained in the East after 1099 indicated, the most impor-
tant princes of the crusading army used the opportunity for the establish-
ment of lordships and social climbing. The primary goal of the Crusade 
for the simple pilgrims, the fulfĳilment of the vow of pilgrimage by going 
to Jerusalem, became thus a sort of luxury for individual nobles. For these 
nobles the securing of newly acquired individual lordships against Turk-
ish, Greek or competing Frankish claims enjoyed priority. This applied to 
Bohemond, the fĳirst prince of Antioch, and Count Baldwin I of Edessa, 
who fĳirst visited the Holy Places half a year after their capture; and it was 
exactly the case for Raymond, who only under pressure from the simple 
pilgrims in Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman, ʿArqa and Tripoli, renounced the idea of 
establishing a lordship of his own.67
Of the lords going to Jerusalem as armed pilgrims, the duke and counts 
of Normandy, Flanders, Vermandois and Blois, three parties were dis-
tinct and they were endeavouring already before July 1099 in reciprocal 
rivalry to establish permanent lordships. They were (1) Duke Geofffrey of 
Lower Lorraine and his brother Baldwin, (2) Bohemond of Tarento and 
his nephew Tancred and fĳinally (3) Count Raymond of Toulouse and his 
retainer Raymond Pilet. The establishment of the Lorrainers in Edessa had 
for the time being resolved the antagonism between Normans and Lor-
rainers, which at the end of October 1097 had led to continuous quarrels 
at al-Massisa over the Cilician towns and even to open hostilities between 
the soldiers of Tancred and Baldwin. Yet the opposition between Normans 
and Provençals remained over the turn of the century. In January 1099 
Raymond lost his position in Antioch to Bohemond.68 After the resistance 
of peregrini and princes had already repeatedly frustrated his plans, he 
had to surrender the citadel of Jerusalem to Godfrey in July 1099. A little 
66 Cf. Yewdale, Bohemond I, 23–4; Nicholson, Tancred, 16; Hill, Raymond IV, 36–7. Ray-
mond had been regarded since 1079 as a promoter of ecclesiastical reform (with which 
Urban II was also proceeding), although he had twice been excommunicated by Gregory 
VII on account of an uncanonical marriage and simony. Godfrey of Bouillon also has a 
bad reputation earlier in the monastic chronicles of his homeland, in spite of lavish gifts, 
because of attacks on ecclesiastical property.
67 Hagenmeyer, Chronologie, VII, 497–9.
68 According to Raymond of Aguilers (Raim. Aguil., 83), Bohemond had driven the Lor-
rainers, Flemings and Provençals out of the citadel of Antioch in July 1098.
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later in mid-August, after the victory of the Franks over the Egyptians, 
he failed in his attempt to obtain the town of Ascalon through Godfrey’s 
objection.69 Tancred took Raymond prisoner in 1101 and made him swear 
not to undertake the establishment of a lordship in northern Syria. Ray-
mond was under further pressure from the peregrini, whose leadership he 
had assumed, than were his rivals. Thus, the Crusade, following the death 
of the papal legate Adhemar of Le Puy and the withdrawal of the Byzan-
tine contingent at the latest, was formed of only two groups. In order to 
understand the relations of the Crusaders with the Muslims in the follow-
ing months up to the taking of Jerusalem, it must be asked whether the 
duality of interests shown to exist between the peregrini and the nobility, 
with their propensity to establish lordships, is again to be found in the 
image that the Crusaders formed of Islam and the Muslims.
A sharp antagonism between the world of populus Dei and heathendom 
characterised the crusading propaganda in the contemporary sources of 
whatever provenance. In the interpretation of Western Christendom the 
Crusades are regarded as struggles of universal historical, even eschato-
logical, signifĳicance between belief and unbelief. ‘Verily the West rose up 
against the East, a little people against a numerous nation, Europe against 
Asia, yea even Africa, Belief against Unbelief; we were protected by Faith, 
they were enshrouded in Error.’70 Thus, a sermon on the occasion of an 
anniversary of the taking of Jerusalem ascribed to Fulcher of Chartres. 
Latin chronicles of the Crusade, vernacular epics of chivalry of the early 
crusading period, recorded papal speeches—all uniformly convey the 
picture of a sharp contrast between milites, fĳideles, coadiutores Christi, 
gens sancta71 and their Muslim adversaries, described at best as pagani, 
infĳideles and gentiles, but often enough as excommunicata generatio, gens 
barbara, nefaria, nefanda, perfĳida or gentes immundae. Especially hostile 
authors such as Fulcher of Chartres and Walter the Chancellor even stig-
matize the Muslims as ‘gens [. . .] spreta, degener et daemonum ancilla’ 
and ‘satellites daemonum, erroris cariae imbuti.’72 The uniform harmony 
of the sources gives rise to the supposition that this pattern of black and 
69 Hagenmeyer, Chronologie, VII, 432, 492.
70 Scriptum Galeranni, 162.
71 Cf. for instance Rousset, Origines, 71; Riley-Smith, First Crusade, 59–61; Fulcher, 
Carnot., 901.
72 To cite but a few examples: Gesta Francorum, VIII, 2, p. 179 and IX, 7, pp. 203–4; 
Robert the Monk, I, I, p. 728; Fulcher, Carnot., I, III, 6, 135; Walter the Chancellor, I, VI, 4, 
p. 75 and II, XVI, 7, p. 113. Cf. Rousset, Origines, 104–5; Darbishire, Idea, 116; Schwartz, Bild; 
Schwinges, Kreuzzugsideologie, 105.
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white corresponds to the common opinion within the crusading army. 
Similarly, the motive of the savage heathen, which had been characteristic 
of Latin chronicles since the Carolingian period, dominated in chronicles 
and epics of the early twelfth century.
One root of this demonizing of heathendom in propaganda was the 
slight knowledge available in Europe and among the Crusaders of Islam. 
Even in the predominantly clerical sector of the highly educated, the state 
of knowledge about Islam was rudimentary and was fed more from legends 
and reports of Saracen atrocities than from the study of Eastern Christian, 
Byzantine or Spanish apologetics that were largely unknown. The gener-
ally low level of information in Europe outside the Iberian Peninsula is 
reflected also in the accounts of those who participated in the Crusade. 
They are a mixture of scanty information from legend and folklore. None 
of the historio graphers of the Crusade who personally visited the Holy 
Land gives a discriminating presentation of Islam or political conditions 
in Syria. Two clerics who were not eyewitnesses of the Crusade, Ekkehard 
of Aura, a pilgrim to Jerusalem in 1101, and Guibert of Nogent, showed 
at least some interest. Guibert presented Islam as a Christian heresy in 
his Historia, written in the fĳirst decade of the twelfth century, a revision 
of the anonymous Gesta Francorum. In his presentation of the origin of 
Islam, he certainly follows a current legend, but he is correctly informed 
about the prophethood of Muhammad as not being the Saracens’ god, the 
strict monotheism of Islam and its rejection of orthodox Christology and 
Trinitarianism.73
Among the participants in the Crusade, on the other hand, the Mus-
lims were clearly considered not as heretics, but rather as heathens. The 
sources originating in their ranks employ an undiffferentiated terminol-
ogy (pagani, gentiles, increduli, perfĳidi . . .), which takes no account of the 
Isidorian distinction between gentiles as ‘those still unconverted’ and 
pagani as adherents of a deliberately anti-Christian religious system. 
An eloquent example is the letter that the leaders of the Crusade sent 
on 11 September 1098 from Antioch to Pope Urban II. This letter explic-
itly separates ‘Turks and Pagans’, who are to be combated, from ‘Greek, 
Armenian and Syrian Jacobite [. . .] heretics’, whom one would not harm.74 
Common to all the sources is the ethnical diffferentiation of the enemy 
into Turks, Persians, Arabs or Saracens, Ethiopians and others. The Franks 
73 Guibert of Nogent, I, IV, 127–30.
74 Hagenmeyer, Epistulae, 164; Isidor of Seville, VIII, 10, 2.
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were also aware of the political fragmentation of the Islamic lands into 
autonomous territorial lordships, of the antagonism between Turks and 
Fatimids and of the linked confessional separation between Sunnis and 
Shiites, the theological or historical grounds of which were, how ever, not 
appreciated. The picture of Islam in the Chanson d’Antioche of the Cru-
sader Richard, in the version of Graindors of Douai originating at the end 
of the twelfth century, which Darbishire has re searched, is identical with 
the level of knowledge of contemporary chronicles and travel literature: 
Islam was conceived of as a religious community, its structure was, how-
ever, not analysed. The Crusaders’ idea of the constellation of powers and 
the constitutional classifĳi cation of the individual territories and rulers in 
Syria also remained nebulous. Caliph and sultan were mentioned as much 
as Mecca was known as the goal of the Islamic pilgrimage. Topographical 
terms such as Baudas, Rohais, Caliptum and Coroscane or rulers’ names 
such as Sansodine, Malquidant, Corboran, Aoxianus and Lavedelius were 
reproduced more or less correctly phonetically, so far as the Crusaders 
came directly into contact with them. On the whole, however, it was a 
matter of haphazard recording, not of an analytical, systematic and inquir-
ing interest in understanding.75 Accordingly, abundant phenomena were 
noted which appeared as curiosities to the Westerners, but geographical 
information not derived from the Bible, antiquity or patristic tradition 
was rare. The works of Raymond of Aguilers and Ekkehard of Aura reveal 
only some knowledge of the political situation in the Middle East follow-
ing the Turkish invasion.76
This low level of interest and knowledge was not only unsuitable to a 
diplomatic and political outlook, but furthered the emphasis on the dis-
tance from the enemy and hence his demonization. Yet, there existed two 
correctives which could facilitate a link between the knightly element and 
the unbelievers. One was the identifĳication of Islam with the paganism of 
antiquity or at least the approximation of Islam to the pantheon of the 
ancient religions in the mentality of the medieval West. The other was 
the assumed analogy between the structure of rule and religion in the 
West and the Orient. Both elements are marked above all in the courtly 
epics of the twelfth century, produced by laymen for an aristocratic pub-
lic. There was a tendency during the period to subsume the whole world 
of religions, apart from the sphere of Christianity and Judaism, under an 
75 Darbishire, Idea, 115–22; Hill, Views, 6; Schwartz, Bild; 144.
76 Raim. Aguil., 64, 109–110; Ekkehard of Aura, II, 1, p. 54–V, 1, p. 80.
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undiffferent iated concept as heathens and to include the Muslims as a 
whole in the category of heathens without distinguishing them from other 
current forms of heathendom. This opened the way to the identifĳication 
of Islam with the cults of classical antiquity and the Old Testament, the 
content and varied forms of which had been handed down to the West. 
The mixture of ancient polytheistic religions and monotheistic Islam in 
the intellectual world of the West led indeed on the one hand to the idea 
that Muslims worshiped the whole ancient pantheon with the inclusion of 
a deifĳied Muhammad.77 On the other hand it allowed the positive appre-
ciation of the high cultural level of Islam and outstanding personalities, 
like famous pagans of antiquity.78
Seeing Islam in the tradition of pagan antiquity thus suggested to the 
Christians of the beginning of the twelfth century a certain understanding 
of Islam as a religion. But it was still more signifĳicant for the Western per-
ception of Islam as an institutional and political system that the enemy’s 
culture was not thought of as a unique phenomenon, but as something par-
allel to the ordering of the Christian commonwealth. The striking symme-
try in description when Christian and Muslim war-standards, battle-cries, 
knightly society or sacred books are compared in the sources provides 
sufffĳicient proof of this.79 The slighter a Frankish historian’s actual knowl-
edge of Islam, the more he tended to employ analogies to Western institu-
tions. This is clearest in the sources which stand in the tradition of Gesta 
Francorum, according to which in 1098 Kirbogha of Mosul is said to have 
begun a fĳictional letter as follows: ‘To the caliph our pope and the lord 
sultan our king, that most valiant warrior and to the most valiant knights 
of Khurasan.’80 The pope of the Turks (papa Turcorum)81 together with 
heathen priests not only incites to combat against the Christians in the 
contemporary Western accounts, but promises the forgiveness of sins and 
grants ‘permission to slay the Christians’.82 Beside him stands the sultan, 
who as the emperor of the Persians (sultanus, scilicet imperator Persidis) 
77 For instance Gesta Francorum, XXI, 9, p. 322, XXII, 1, p. 323 and XXXIX, 17, p. 497/8; 
Tudebod, 80; Fulcher Carnot., I, XV, 7, p. 220.
78 This tendency only appeared in the course of the twelfth century (Schwartz, Bild, 
38–9). From it developed the concept of the noble heathen, which appears explicitly only 
at the turn of the thirteenth century and not in the period of the First Crusade.
79 Plocher, Studien, 16–20; Hagenmeyer, Epistulae, 159.
80 Gesta Francorum, XXI, 7–9, pp. 323–5. Similarly, Guibert of Nogent, V, X, 191; Baldric 
of Dol, III, III, 62.
81 Raim. Aguil., 110. Cf. Guibert of Nogent, V, VIII, 189.
82 Guibert of Nogent, V, VIII and X, 289, 191; Gesta Francorum, XXI, 1, p. 313. Plocher, 
Studien, 20.
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sends out his generalissimo (princeps militiae soldani Persiae) against the 
Crusaders.83 Princes subordinate to the caliph and the sultan were desig-
nated as reges if they held positions as amirs, although the terminology 
difffers with individual chroniclers.84
Islam was obviously understood not as existing in its own right, but 
as an anti-commonwealth analogous to the Christian commonwealth. 
In the eyes of the Crusaders the European feudal system logically pro-
vided the structure for the reciprocal legal relations of Islamic princes. 
Thus, Gesta Francorum reports that the son of the Turkish lord of Antioch 
had to render homage to Kirbogha of Mosul in 1098 and that an oath of 
allegiance was demanded of Ahmad b. Marwan before Kirbogha would 
appoint him as castellan of the citadel of Antioch.85 The ambivalent pic-
ture of the Muslims, here as servants of Satan, there as heathens of equal 
knightly status, may with some care be assigned to the interest groups in 
the crusading army which have already been investigated. The picture of 
classical paganism may have strongly influenced clerics and peregrine, but 
knights and princes assumed or recognized among the Muslim warriors 
and rulers, especially the Turks, related ethical and legal ideas. Accord-
ing to Guibert, the Turks thus surpassed the Egyptians in such qualities 
as fĳitness for war, chivalry and personal virtue.86 According to the Gesta, 
the formerly Christian Turks were even descended from the Franks. Chiv-
alry, it says in the same place, is naturally reserved to Turks and Franks 
alone. Had those people only the true Faith, there would be none so fĳit 
for warfare in the world.87 The hypothesis of a genealogical relationship 
between Turks and Franks found further extension in the West following 
the Crusade and in the thirteenth century even emerges in the French 
chansons de geste.88
The picture of knightly equality was not only a literary common place 
but also the common opinion among the princes of the Crusade when 
beleaguered in Antioch. This is proved by the fact that the crusading 
83 Fulcher Carnot., I, XV, 7, p. 220; Gesta Francorum, XXI, 1, p. 313. Cf. Hagenmeyer, 
Epistulae, 159 and Guibert of Nogent, V, VIII, 189.
84 Gesta Francorum, XXI, 1, pp. 313–5, XXXIV, 4, p. 415, XXXIV, 10, pp. 422–4, XX, 1, 
p. 293; XXI, 5, p. 318; Albert of Aix, III, LIX, 379; Hagenmeyer, Epistulae, 150 (Stephen of 
Blois); Guibert of Nogent, V, X, 191.
85 Gesta Francorum, XXI, 3, p. 316, XXI, 5, 318. Cf. Albert of Aix, IV, XLIV, 420.
86 Guibert of Nogent, I, V, 131.
87 Gesta Francorum, IX, 11, pp. 207–8. Cf. Baldric of Dol, II, III, 35–6; Albert of Aix, II, 
XXVII, 319. Admiration of the Turks’ aptness for warfare appears repeatedly in the sources 
throughout the twelfth century (cf. Ambroise, V.5067–5070, 135).
88 Rigord, 38, pp. 55–6.
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princes’ envoys, Peter the Hermit and his interpreter Herluin, proposed 
on 27 June 1098 to Kirbogha, the commander of the Turkish relieving 
army, that knightly duels should decide the future possession of the city.89 
The Turks had previously rejected an invitation to conversion. According 
to Albert of Aix, who wrote the relevant part of his chronicle in Europe 
c. 1102 on the basis of Lorrainer eyewitness accounts, mutual oath-taking 
and exchange of hostages were to safeguard the duels (reminiscent of a 
divine judgment). Even though this proposal was made in a supposedly 
hopeless military position, a diffferent picture of the Muslims emerges 
here. According to the jus gentium, the ‘law of nations’, the heathen 
Kirbogha is a valid partner in negotiations and potentially in a treaty.90 
Certainly according to Isidore of Seville, whose defĳinition of jus gentium 
was to fĳind entry as the medieval locus classicus into the Decretum of Gra-
tian and thereby into canonical tradition, agreements between states did 
not depend on the confessional status of the treaty partner. Peace treaties 
( foedera pacis), armistices (indutiae) and immunities of envoys belong 
exactly for this reason to jus gentium, because these legal institutions are 
known to almost all peoples regardless of their religious afffĳiliations.91
Thus, the question arises of whether and how the interest groups in 
the crusading army were actually ready to enter into treaty relations 
with the Muslims in favour of the realization of their diffferent aims. Or 
did the idea of demonizing and exterminating the heathen, in combina-
tion with the prefĳiguration of the Crusades by the Israelites’ acquisition 
of Canaan according to Urban’s speech in Clermont and as held by the 
simple peregrini, forbid all Crusaders alike to come to terms with Muslim 
princes—even while recognizing their equality of status?92 It has often 
been observed that participants in the First Crusade did understand it as 
a missionary enterprise, unlike its interpretation in memoranda about the 
Crusade that authors such as Raymond Lull, Marino Sanudo and Pierre 
Dubois wrote later at the end of the thirteenth century.93 Nevertheless, 
89 Raim. Aguil., 79, 81; Fulcher Carnot., I, XXI, 1, p. 248; Albert of Aix, IV, XLV, 420–1; 
Ralph of Caen, LXXXI, 663–4; Cafffaro, I, 54.
90 Cf. Albert of Aix, IV, XLV, 420–1.
91 Isidor of Seville, V, 6 and V, 7.
92 Baldric of Dol, I, IV, 15. Urban’s interpretation of the acquisition of the land by the 
Israelites as prefĳiguring the Crusade must indeed have hindered treaty relations between 
Franks and Muslims. The Bible asserts that the Israelites had to lay almost all of their 
conquests under the ban, and it expressly includes the interdiction both of marriage and 
of the conclusion of covenants (Deut. 7, 2–5; Joshua 6, 17, 10, 28).
93 Cutler, Conversion, 57. Cf. Schwartz, Bild, 95–8.
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some remarks in the sources seem to point to the Crusaders having made 
the conversion of Muslim partners to treaties an indispensable condition. 
Thus, the Historia belli sacri, originating after 1131, gives an account of a 
Frankish embassy which departed for Egypt before the conquest of Nicaea 
in May or June 1097 to set before the Fatimid Wazir al-Afdal the choice 
of conversion and friendship or war.94 On the march southwards from 
Antioch at the beginning of February 1099, according to another account, 
Raymond of Toulouse refused the treaty desired by the qadi of Tripoli, 
allegedly because the qadi had fĳirst to be converted.95 On the capture of 
Antioch in 1098 on two occasions Muslim commanders changed to the 
Christian faith: fĳirst the commandant of a tower, Firuz, whose treachery 
had enabled the Franks to capture the town.96 Shortly later, after the vic-
tory over the Turkish relieving army, there was a similar development. In 
view of the Frankish victory, the commandant appointed by Kirbogha, 
Ahmad b. Marwan, surrendered the citadel to Bohemond’s Normans, 
accepted baptism with the majority of his men and obtained for those 
who wished to remain Muslims safe conduct to Aleppo.97
Closer consideration, however, shows that in all these cases conversion 
was not an essential condition for the conclusion of a treaty. Raymond’s 
refusal to conclude a peace with the ruler of Tripoli can be explained 
(as will be shown) not out of religious sensibility, but out of his inter-
est in founding a lordship of his own in the qadi’s sphere of influence. 
In the cases of Firuz and Ahmad b. Marwan, according to the tenor of 
the sources, conversion was merely something additional to the treaty, 
not its condition. The change of religion might, however, seem opportune 
to both the converts. Firuz himself, a former Christian and an apostate 
of Armenian origin, might have had under Bohemond’s protection little 
good to expect for himself and his extensive estates from the fanaticism 
of the peregrini, had he remained Muslim.98 For Ahmad b. Marwan, it was 
94 Hist. bell. sacri, XX, 181.
95 Hagenmeyer, Chronologie, VII, 439.
96 Gesta Francorum, XX, 1, pp. 293–5. Cf. Hagenmeyer, Chronologie, VII, 284–5 and 
Cutler, Conversion, 57.
97 Cutler, Conversion, 155–8. Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 137–8 confĳirms the versions of 
those Western sources mentioned in Hagenmeyer, Chronologie, VII, 310–1, but says noth-
ing of a change of religion by Ahmad b. Marwan. After the capitulation on 5 July 1098, he 
is said to have lived in a house in Antioch. After the garrison left for Aleppo, however, it 
was almost completely demolished by the Armenians.
98 According to Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 274, Firuz received an iqtaʿ from Bohemond. Did 
he receive it according to Western forms? Nothing is known as to his fate thereafter. If his 
Christian name was indeed Bohemond, as Albert of Aix, IV, XV, 399 says, he was identical 
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probably the case that in his desperate situation he would receive bet-
ter conditions—if we do not suppose with Cutler that the victory of the 
Christians over Kirbogha, achieved with enormous religious enthusiasm 
after the discovery of the Holy Lance, had proved to him the superiority 
of the Christian God.99 The example of Jerusalem a year later shows that 
the surrender of a citadel against free with drawal could be accomplished 
entirely pragmatically and without conditions of a religious nature. After 
the capture of the city, Raymond of Toulouse took possession of the 
Tower of David on 13 July 1099 and allowed the Egyptian garrison to be 
conducted safely to Ascalon in accordance with his oath.100 Finally, the 
appeal to al-Afdal and Kirbogha to change their religion and the corre-
sponding counter-offfer of Kirbogha to Peter the Hermit had in the given 
circumstances a clearly rhetorical character and surely do not constitute the 
actual contents of the negotiations.101
The examples cited already indicate that on the First Crusade there were 
contacts with hostile powers. What role did diplomacy play in the crusad-
ing army and how did the diplomatic connections with Middle Eastern 
states and rulers correlate with the interest groups among the Crusaders? 
After the capture of Antioch in 1098 and the victory over the relieving 
army, the council of the crusading princes decided at the beginning of 
July to continue the march on Jerusalem at the beginning of November. 
The Lorrainers, concerned with setting up territories, the Normans of 
Bohemond and the Provençals used the inter vening time for the exten-
sion and consolidation of the lands already in their possession. Bohemond 
and Raymond operated in regions with a power vacuum after the death of 
Yaghisiyan that were mostly inhabited by Christians. On the other hand, 
the newly acquired positions of the Lorrainers in Edessa, Turbessel and 
Ravendel (al-Rawandan) were extraordinarily exposed.102 Since February 
1098, probably before the advance of Kirbogha’s relieving army, Godfrey 
of Bouillon’s brother Baldwin had succeeded in reinforcing his position 
in Edessa as sole ruler after the townspeople’s revolt against his adoptive 
to the convert Bohemond, the dragoman and agent of the Provençals mentioned by Raim. 
Aguil., 158–9.
 99 Cutler, Conversion, 157–8.
100 Raim. Aguil., 151. Cf. Gesta Francorum, XXXIX, 2, p. 477.
101  The shariʿa recognizes an invitation to conversion before a struggle with non-
Muslims. The Hanafĳi madhhab, to which Kirbogha as a Turk probably belonged, virtually 
makes the summons to Islam a duty (cf. Khaddouri, War, 95fff ).
102 On the formation of lordships in Northern Syria and Cillicia cf. Raim. Aguil., 84; Ibn 
al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 131–3; Yewdale, Bohemond I, 74–9.
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father Toros. In consequence of his meagre military capacities, however, 
he was in need of diplomatic means to secure this.
Directly after his arrival in Edessa, Baldwin, together with an Armenian 
contingent under Toros’ subordinate Constantine of Gargar, marched 
against Sumaysat, lying to the north-west, where he had been attacked 
on his way to Edessa. The operation ended unfortu nately. Nevertheless, it 
succeeded in placing a large part of the heavily armed Lorrainers in the 
nearby castle of St. John. They made trouble subsequently for their enemy, 
the Amir Balduq of Sumaysat, through guerrilla warfare.103 Albert of Aix 
describes that after the murder of Toros, the amir realized that he could 
no longer oppose the constant growth of Baldwin’s power and offfered 
him the sale of Sumaysat for 10,000 bezants and furthermore volunteered 
to serve him faithfully as a mercenary. Baldwin at fĳirst appeared unim-
pressed by this offfer, since Balduq had shortly before wrongfully occu-
pied Sumaysat, a possession of Edessa. Only on the advice of his men did 
Baldwin decide to conclude a treaty as the period of Balduq’s ultimatum 
was threatening to run out. After its lapse, Balduq threatened that not 
only would he no longer keep the peace he would also burn his fortress 
to the ground and behead the hostages whom he had taken as security 
for an annual tribute from Edessa. Thereupon the business was settled. 
The count installed his knights in Sumaysat; Balduq went to Edessa as 
condomesticus and familiaris and promised in accordance with Baldwin’s 
request to provide his wife and sons as hostages because of mistrust and 
in order to establish faith. The promise, however, was not fulfĳilled.104
A little later the Franks brought Saruj, the neighbour of Edessa to the 
south-west, under their control. It was at the time in the possession of the 
Artuqid Belek, a nephew of the Amir Sukman of Jerusalem. According to 
the version of the Chronicon ad A.C. 1234 pertinens, when Saruj appeared to 
be no longer tenable owing to the constant Frankish and Armenian raids, 
a delegation from Belek offfered its surrender to Count Baldwin against 
certain promises, which were sworn and exchanged—perhaps in writing.105 
Albert of Aix states the matter diffferently. According to him, Belek had 
concluded an alliance with the count against Saruj, which had rebelled 
against him. The people of the threatened city had indeed fĳirst attempted 
to engage Turkish mercenaries for the defence, but then in view of the 
103 Albert of Aix, III, XXI, 353–4; Matthew of Edessa, 218–9.
104 Albert of Aix, III, XXIV, 355–6.
105 Chronicon ad A.C. 1234 pertinens, II, 47.
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Frankish advance, had sought a peaceful settlement. Gifts were sent to 
Baldwin and the payment of tribute promised. According to Albert, Bald-
win fĳixed a day for the offfĳicial conclusion of the treaty and handed over 
the city and the citadel to a knight called Fulcher of  Chartres.106 The tenor 
of both sources is similar. According to both accounts, this resulted in the 
conclusion of a peace treaty secured by oaths between Franks and Turks, 
which included (perhaps fĳinancial) promises. Still more remarkable, and 
this might have been particularly scandalous for both pious Muslims and 
pious Christians, is that Saruj, a city inhabited by Muslims, was surren-
dered to Christians. The latter did indeed levy tribute, but practised no 
kind of forcible conversion, nor did they make other religious demands. 
There can be no doubt of the historicity of these events in spite of the 
silence of such well-informed chroniclers as Fulcher of Chartres and 
 Matthew of Edessa, since Ekkehard of Aura seemingly also heard of them 
in the Holy Land three years later.107
The undoubtedly most spectacular instance of cooperation between 
Lorrainers and Turks during the First Crusade is better documented. 
At the end of August or beginning of September 1098, a call for help 
from ʿUmar, the governor of ʿAzaz, reached Baldwin in Edessa and God-
frey, whose location at the time is not quite clear. ʿUmar had rebelled 
against Ridwan of Aleppo and needed help against a threatened puni-
tive  expedition.108 This offfered Godfrey the opportunity of neutralizing 
ʿAzaz, strategically signifĳicant as a link between the Lorrainers and almost 
half-way between Antioch and Edessa. If Albert of Aix is purged of all 
panegyrics on behalf of Godfrey, the three authori tative sources provide 
an almost uniform picture of the event.109 Either threatened or already 
beleaguered by Ridwan, ʿUmar asked for peace and support through a Syr-
ian Christian, whereupon Godfrey was said to have reacted at fĳirst with 
reserve owing to mistrust of the Turk. When his envoys informed him 
about Godfrey’s hesitation, ʿUmar sent his son Muhammad as a hostage 
with a second embassy so that Godfrey was reassured and concluded a 
treaty of peace and alliance. For reasons of security and speed, the written 
draft was transmitted to ʿAzaz by pigeon-post.110 In mid-September God-
frey and Baldwin relieved the beleaguered place, after additional Turks 
106 Albert of Aix, III, XXV, 356.
107 Ekkehard of Aura, XXI, 3, pp. 211–3.
108 Albert of Aix, V, VI–VII, 436–7.
109 Albert of Aix, V, VI–X, 436–9; Raim. Aguil., 88–9; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 141.
110 Albert of Aix, V, VIII–IX, 437–8.
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had reinforced it. Under pressure from Godfrey, Raymond of Toulouse 
and Bohemond joined them after initial reserve. ʿUmar’s sworn promise of 
allegiance (but seemingly not of vassalage) renewed the alliance between 
Franks and Turks after their victory. In a heavily symbolic ceremony, God-
frey presented to ʿUmar outside the fortress a valuable helmet and a lance. 
While Muhammad remained in Antioch under Lorrainer guardianship as 
a hostage, Godfrey proceeded forthwith to Edessa.
For our investigation of the existence of alliances during the First Cru-
sade, the way in which the chronicler Raymond of Aguilers explains the 
count of Toulouse’s hesitant provision of aid is most instructive. After the 
garrison of ʿAzaz had promised the surrender of the fortress to Godfrey in 
recompense for his support, he hastened to Antioch to mobilize the other 
Crusaders there. Raymond, just convalescent, only set out when Godfrey 
brought religious arguments into play: Raymond should help the heathen 
Turks for God, the fame of the Franks, and for Godfrey’s sake, especially as 
they held out the cross against the siege-engines set up against them. Was 
it then that Raymond, unlike Geofffrey, made the conversion of a poten-
tial treaty partner a condition of the pact? The exceedingly condensed 
description of the matter by Raymond of Aguilers is not, however, com-
pletely convincing. The alleged offfer by the governor, ʿUmar, to surrender 
his fortress is suspect to begin with since, in spite of the successful conclu-
sion of the alliance, nothing further is heard of it afterwards, even in Ray-
mond of Aguilers’ report. Would ʿUmar really have rebelled with the view 
of surrendering his fortress to another lord within a month? Albert of Aix, 
who knows nothing of such an offfer, presents on the contrary the legal 
relationship between Godfrey and ʿUmar as a military alliance between 
partners of equal legal, but not of equal social standing, as foedus aequum 
in the terminology of Roman law, for which the inferior party had to pro-
vide hostages. This obviously corresponds to the course of the afffair: it was 
a matter of establishing Lorrainer suzerainty over ʿAzaz.111
Equally unconvincing is Raymond’s argument concerning conversion. 
Neither Albert nor the local historian of Aleppo Ibn al-ʿAdim knows any-
thing of crosses or an offfer of conversion. Raymond also does not mention 
that the Provençals later insisted on the baptism of the freed garrison. If 
such a religious demand may be credited to the count of Toulouse, cer-
tainly it may not to Bohemond, who had hesitated equally long to march 
111 Cf. Tellenbach, Zusammenleben, 2, 7–8; Albert of Aix, V, XV, 441; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, 
II, 141.
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to ʿAzaz. The true reason why the other princes fĳirst put offf Godfrey after 
he had asked for help may have been that they felt no necessity to support 
him in the foundation of a territorial lordship relatively near to Antioch 
in the face of rival self-interests. This is evidenced on the one hand by the 
fact that only Godfrey’s very heavy pressure on Bohemond and Raymond, 
i.e. the threat of enmity and the denial of any further help, brought about 
a joint operation. On the other hand, the remark of Raymond of Aguilers 
shows that the count of Toulouse had at the same time planned on his 
own account a raid to the south in the same direction.112 The instances 
of Sumaysat, Saruj and ʿAzaz emphasize that both Godfrey and Baldwin 
were pragmatic in their policy and were prepared for cooperation with 
Muslim princes when it seemed profĳitable to them. Since Bohemond’s 
actions during the First Crusade are almost completely irrelevant to the 
question of cooperation, the policy of Raymond of Toulouse in regard to 
treaties and conquests remains to be investigated.
The Provençals strove to establish a foothold south-east of Antioch 
in the frontier region of Aleppo and Shayzar directly after the victory 
over Kirbogha. In mid-July 1098, the Christian population of Tall Man-
nas had opened the gates to a patrolling force under Raymond Pilet. A 
neighbouring fortress held by Muslims was stormed on the initiative of 
Syrian Christians in cooperation with the Franks on the 25th of the same 
month. According to the Gesta Francorum, the sole contemporary source 
to mention this, there occurred on this occasion a hitherto unique scene: 
Pilet had all the Muslims who refused conversion massacred. The Franks 
sufffered a painful defeat from a Turkish detachment from Aleppo when 
they proceeded against Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman two days later.113 Neverthe-
less, Raymond of Toulouse resumed his strategy after the relief of ʿAzaz 
with the capture of nearby al-Bara. He had Peter of Narbonne installed as 
bishop and endowed him with half of the town and its vicinity.114 After 
the lapse of the November date, agreed in July 1098, for the march to Jeru-
salem, the pressure of the peregrini on the princes clearly became stron-
ger. As already indicated, Raymond had no choice, but to put himself at 
the head of the pilgrim movement, in order not to forfeit his influence. 
This, however, indicated a conflict of interests, since the leadership of the 
peregrini did not automatically signify for Raymond the surrender of his 
112 Albert of Aix, V, XI, 439; Raim. Aguil., 88–9. Cf. Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 141.
113 Gesta Francorum, XXX, 5–9, pp. 386–9; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 138.
114 Raim. Aguil., 91–2.
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territorial ambitions for which he (albeit not so extensively as Godfrey) 
had arranged diplomatic contacts. The three stages of his advance south-
wards make this clear.
First, on 27 November 1098, the siege of Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman began after 
the conclusion of the delicate agreement between Bohemond and Ray-
mond in favour of the departure for Jerusalem. Provençal and Flemish 
troops participated in it and later Bohemond’s army as well. The well-
known circumstances of the siege, ending in one of the worst massacres of 
the crusading period, do not require further comment here. All the sources 
mention that Bohemond, in breach of his guarantee of safety (aman), slew, 
enslaved and pillaged numerous inhabitants gathered in a safe house.115 A 
highly informative piece of information by the Damascene contemporary, 
Ibn al-Qalanisi is, however, not found in the other sources. According to 
this, the Franks had, before the capture of the place, frequently offfered 
an agreement through envoys, which simply stipulated the stationing of 
a garrison and the sparing of lives and property in return for the surren-
der of Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman. Since, however, the besieged were disunited 
over its acceptance (probably expecting further relief from Ridwan of 
Aleppo), no treaty was concluded.116 Unfortunately, the report of this reli-
able chronicler stands alone and lacks confĳirmation on the Frankish side. 
If it is correct, two conclusions result: fĳirst, that Raymond had in mind 
for Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman a legal status modelled on that of Saruj, without 
the extermination or expulsion of the Muslim population; secondly, that 
perhaps he used diplomatic means in order to gain sole possession of the 
town before Bohemond’s arrival. We stand on fĳirmer ground with the 
events of the following weeks.
Secondly, after the renewed disagree ment with Bohemond and the 
pressure of the peregrini had prevented Raymond from establishing him-
self in Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman, he advanced further south from mid-January 
1099 after a foraging operation against the territories of Aleppo. Accom-
panied by Robert of Normandy and Tancred, whom he had taken into 
his employ, Raymond and the Crusaders marched by way of Kafartab, 
which they captured, to Shayzar and Masyaf. They stormed Hisn al-Akrad 
(the later Crac des Chevaliers) and a month after their departure the 
protracted siege of ʿArqa began. They concluded a series of treaties with 
Muslim rulers during these weeks. Shortly after the departure, probably 
115 Gesta Francorum, XXXIII, 7, pp. 407–8; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 142–3.
116 Ibn al-Qalānisī, 136.
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in Kafartab, the Crusaders made peace (pax) with Abu al-ʿAsakir Sultan, 
the ruler of Shayzar. In addition to a money-payment, the amir of Shayzar 
undertook not to molest the Franks within his lord ship and to sell them 
horses and food. The course of relations with Shayzar was certainly not 
without  problems—the amir had the land cleared of men and animals 
and threatened the Crusaders with a ban on trading if they did not with-
draw further from the suburbs of his fortress. Nevertheless, the Franks 
were able to proceed unmolested, led across the Orontes by two guides 
from Shayzar. In addition, two non-aggression pacts were entered into 
with Muslim petty lords or governors, with whom treaties were concluded 
(against payments of cash and horses) with a sworn undertaking not to 
attack pilgrims.117
Thirdly, the following two and a half months up to the departure from 
Tripoli in mid-May 1099 can be called with complete justifĳication the hey-
day of diplomatic contacts during the First Crusade. Already during the 
storming of Hisn al-Akrad, envoys from Hims and Tripoli had been in the 
Frankish camp—obviously to sound out a treaty. Impressed by the rapid-
ity of its capture, they returned with Raymond’s permission to their lords 
in order to bring yet more gifts in return for the expected conclusion of 
a treaty. With Janah al-Dawla of Hims, who had hitherto belonged to the 
most decided opponents of the Crusaders along with Kirbogha, Duqaq 
and Ridwan, there was obviously no problem in reaching agreement over 
the same conditions as with Shayzar.118 However, Raymond of Toulouse 
reacted otherwise to the offfer of a treaty by the Qadi Jalal al-Mulk of 
Tripoli, who declared himself ready to enter faithfully into a pact and to 
establish friendship.119 According to Raymond of Aguilers, Raymond sent 
a Provençal counter-embassy to Tripoli on the qadi’s initiative. They are 
said to have been so impressed by the riches of the city that they suc-
cessfully urged their count to extort a higher tribute by besieging ʿArqa. 
The anonymous author of the Gesta even reports that Raymond made the 
conversion of Jalal al-Mulk the requirement for a treaty.120 Considering 
the high authority of the Gesta, this report is quite credible, although Ray-
mond of Aguilers does not mention it and although it appears surprising 
after the previous conclusions of treaties. Possibly, Raymond of Aguilers, 
the Provençal chronicler who as court chaplain was in the circle closest 
117 Gesta Francorum, XXXIV, 4–7, pp. 415–9; Raim. Aguil., 102–6.
118 Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 278.
119 Gesta Francorum, XXXIV, 4–7, pp. 415–9; Raim. Aguil., 107.
120 Gesta Francorum, XXXVI, 1, p. 438.
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to the count, wished to protect his lord by silence from the reproach that 
he subsequently let the demand for conversion drop when concluding the 
treaty. Another explanation is still more plausible. Does the Gesta per-
haps repeat the gossip going the rounds in the crusading army, possibly 
circulated by the leadership, as to the cause of the refusal of the treaty? 
The desire of the peregrini for Jerusalem, regardless of any strategic or 
political consideration, had already caused Raymond trouble in Antioch 
and Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman and was to do so again after the siege of ʿArqa. 
Taking account of this, it is conceivable that his henchmen attempted to 
fĳind a religious legitimization for the delay in the advance to Jerusalem 
caused by the siege. In the end, whichever of the two sources was correct, 
Raymond’s actual motives for the rejection of Tripoli’s offfer of a treaty lay 
more deeply than in religious scruples. Raymond wanted to round out 
his possessions south of Antioch. Further developments make this clear. 
While for weeks the siege of ʿArqa made no progress, the Provençals, well 
provided for from Cyprus, displayed a lively activity in the conquest of 
new territories. This included the occupation of Antartus (Tortosa), the 
placing of the lord of Maraqiyya (Maraclea) under Frankish suzer ainty 
and the launching of raids against the rule of the ʿAmmar family, qadis of 
Tripoli, in spite of tempting offfers of a treaty.121
Raymond’s lack of interest in a treaty and his choice of further time-
consuming military operations was, in contrast to the opinion of the major-
ity of the Crusaders, also not linked to the fact that he declared himself 
in agreement with the Byzantine envoys to await the arrival of an army 
under the Emperor Alexius. His alleged attempt to incite the other princes 
to storm Tripoli, even after the raising of the siege of ʿArqa, is not the sole 
indication of his position. After the princes had marched from ʿArqa, they 
were to conclude a treaty on the conditions submitted by Jalal al-Mulk 
that would facilitate their march to Jerusalem. The vision of the priest 
Peter Desiderius, which Raymond of Aguilers reported, is truly revealing. 
St. Andrew warned Raymond of Toulouse not to think of ʿArqa and other 
places. God would cause Jerusalem, Alexandria, Cairo and others to fall to 
him, if only he would faithfully proceed to the Holy Places.122 The wording 
of this heavenly message, so little comforting in spite of everything, most 
clearly emphasizes how the establish ment of a lordship on the coast of 
121 Robert the Monk, VIII, XI, p. 853. Cf. Gesta Francorum, XXXIV, 13–4, pp. 426–8; Raim. 
Aguil., 111–2.
122 Raim. Aguil., 131.
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southern Syria obsessed Raymond of Toulouse and it explains his moral 
attitude towards a treaty with Tripoli.
After the preceding analysis of Frankish policy in regard to alliances 
and treaties on a regional basis, the question remains whether the Cru-
saders also had an active supra-regional diplomacy towards states and 
lordships which were not of direct importance to the Frankish interest 
in conquest, but which served their aims. In connection with this, all the 
states neighbouring the route of the Crusaders, the Armenian principali-
ties, Egypt, Aleppo and Damascus, come into consideration. Already dur-
ing the ‘Byzantine’ phase of the Crusade, i.e. even before the taking of 
Nicaea, the Crusaders had their fĳirst contacts with the Armenian princi-
palities of Cilicia and northern Mesopotamia. In consequence, the opera-
tions of the diffferent parts of the army were carried out together with the 
Armenian princes, especially Baldwin’s advance half a year later. Accord-
ing to the Historia belli sacri (c. 1140), an embassy was also sent to Egypt 
on the advice of the Byzantine emperor. It was composed of three Frank-
ish envoys: Hugh of Bellafayre, Bertram of Scabrica and Peter of Picca. 
They were commissioned to deliver letters to the Fatimid Wazir al-Afdal, 
informing him of the Crusaders’ intention to liberate the pilgrims’ way to 
Jerusalem from the hands of the Muslims. Al-Afdal was given the choice 
of accepting conversion and becoming a brother and friend to the Chris-
tians or, if he preferred the friendship of the heathens, of becoming their 
enemy.123 The passage is, unfortunately, found only in the Historia. It is, 
however, known to all the sources that an Egyptian embassy visited the 
crusading army when outside Antioch. This embassy sought to encourage 
the Christians in their struggle against the Turks and to provide help in the 
acquisition of Jerusalem in return for a non-aggression pact. Although the
 other sources say nothing of an embassy sent from Nicaea, the account 
in the Historia is indirectly confĳirmed since the Fatimid counter-embassy 
obviously attempted to conceal the religious gap between the two part-
ners. The Egyptians praised Christ for the victory over the Turkish reliev-
ing army under Ridwan and Sukman b. Artuq, which they had witnessed. 
They furthermore emphasized the friendliness of the Fatimid regime 
towards both native Christians and Frankish pilgrims.124 After the conclu-
sion of the deliberations, the envoys set out on 5 March 1098 together with 
123 Hist. bell. sacri, XXII, 181. Albert of Aix, III, LIX, 379–80 seems to allude to a similar 
embassy. Cf. also Köhler, Jerusalem.
124 Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 132; Raim. Aguil., 58; Albert of Aix, III, LIX, 379–80/7.
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high-ranking Frankish ambassadors for Latakia and took ship for Egypt.125 
The purpose of the Frankish delegation, whose safety the Egyptians had 
guaranteed by oath, was obviously to reach the offfĳicial conclusion of a 
treaty in Cairo.126
More than a year passed after the departure of the ambassadors. New 
movement in the negotiations came only when they returned in the 
spring of 1099 in the company of Egyptian envoys to the Crusaders, who 
meanwhile were at a stand outside ʿArqa. They reported that al-Afdal had 
forbidden an earlier return. After the Crusaders’ victory over the Turkish 
relieving army outside Antioch, the capture of Jerusalem by the Fatimid 
wazir in the late summer of 1098 and the Frankish advance, the atmosphere 
between the two sides had become decidedly cooler. Certainly, Egypt dis-
played a friendliness of tone and sent exceedingly valuable presents to the 
princes, but it remained essentially tough. There was no longer any idea of 
a surrender of Jerusalem. Al-Afdal would merely allow unarmed groups of 
two to three hundred Franks admission to the Holy Places. The indignant 
Crusaders threatened to march on Egypt in a counter-move if Jerusalem 
were not ceded.127 This fĳinal (for the time being) round of negotiations 
between Franks and Fatimids led to no outcome. In July and August 1099 
the Crusaders captured Jerusalem and achieved victory over al-Afdal at 
al-Bissa, near Ascalon. The exchange of embassies with Egypt is, as a rule, 
far from thoroughly dealt with in the secondary literature and the Islamic 
sources are not taken into consideration—arguably because the exchange 
led nowhere and it did not correspond to the concept of the Crusade as a 
war against Islam for the conquest of Palestine.128 For this reason, it is of 
especial value to have a source-critical analysis, since just at this point in 
the First Crusade the possibilities and limitations of Frankish cooperation 
in Palestine were manifested.
According to the traditional interpretation, al-Afdal had wrongly 
regarded the crusading army as acting on behalf of the Byzantines and 
125 Gesta Francorum, XVII, 4–7, pp. 270–4. Cf. Cafffaro, IX, 56–7; Ekkehard of Aura, XVI, 
2, pp. 169–71.
126 Raim. Aguil., 58.
127 Raim. Aguil., 110.
128 Sybel, Geschichte, 352, 403–4; Röhricht, Geschichte, 122–3, 177–9 merely reformulate 
the sources. Runciman, History, I, 229, 273 and Runciman, First Crusade, 315–6, 329 has 
some brief comments. Gibb, Caliphate, 95 rejects the idea of an entente. More detailled 
are Grousset, Histoire, I, 82–5, 143–9 and Chalandon, Comnène, I, 206–7. Hamblin, Army, 
214–20 is the only author to have systematically dicussed the pertinent Islamic sources, but 
he does not focus on Frankish-Fatimid contacts.
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had proposed an entente aiming at the ending of Seljuk rule in Syria as 
well as the reconstitution of the old partition of Syria into a northern Byz-
antine and a southern Fatimid sphere of hegemony. However, the Crusad-
ers’ intention to take possession of Jerusalem and thus of southern Syria 
wrecked this concept of restoration of the status quo ante 1070.129 This 
interpretation, while certainly not altogether erroneous, does not provide 
satisfactory answers to a number of questions. How, in spite of such com-
peting interests generally, was a Frankish-Fatimid agreement reached in 
March 1098? Why did Frankish delegates remain with the Fatimids for 
more than a year? Finally, why did al-Afdal, having captured Jerusalem 
in the late summer of 1098, subsequently defend Jerusalem and Palestine 
so inefffectively against the further advance of the Crusaders? If the Ara-
bic chronicles are utilized beside the known Frankish sources, it appears 
possible to answer these questions. The main source for the contents of 
the Frankish-Fatimid negotiations is the account by the Provençal priest, 
Raymond of Aguilers. In a passage about the return of the Frankish envoys 
to the crusading army at ʿArqa, the chronicler describes the crux of the 
negotiations with Egypt as follows:
He [the lord of Egypt, probably the wazir] had, that is to say, doubted 
whether he should conclude friendship (amicitiam) with us or the Turks. 
We would agree with him as follows: if he gave us help at Jerusalem or sur-
rendered Jerusalem with its dependent territories (pertinenciis), we would 
restore to him all his towns which the Turks had seized from him, if we 
captured them. But the other towns of the Turks which did not belong to his 
realm, we would share between us (inter nos partiremur). But the Turks, as 
was reported to us, would [. . .] fulfĳil this to him: if he engages with them in 
combat against us, they would venerate ʿAli, who is of the Prophet’s family, 
grant him a certain tribute and concede to him many other things in addi-
tion as is not sufffĳiciently known to us.130
In other words, the Franks and the Fatimids negotiated common mili-
tary operations against the Turks who had penetrated Syria some three 
decades previously. In a counter-move, the Turkish rulers of Syrian cit-
ies, or indivi duals among them, were ready for the sake of an alliance 
with Egypt to submit themselves to Egyptian sovereignty and to name 
the Fatimid caliph in the Islamic Friday prayer. This latter appears to 
be entirely credible. Only a year previously, in fact, Ridwan b. Tutush of 
Aleppo, although himself a Sunni, had attempted to introduce the Fatimid 
129 Cf. Runciman, History; Runciman, First Crusade; Grousset, Histoire.
130 Raim. Aguil., 109–10 (indirectly confĳirmed by Hist. bell. sacri, XCIX, 212).
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khutba in northern and central Syria, in order to secure Egyptian help 
against his brother Duqaq in Damascus. The exact descrip tion of the dif-
ferent negotiating positions demonstrates the high reliability of Raymond 
of Aguiler’s statements: he may himself have spoken to the Frankish 
envoys. Unfortunately, it is not possible to date the Frankish offfer more 
exactly. Apparently, al-Afdal did not react to the Seljuk offfer of alliance 
that the Latin chronicler described. This corroborates the seriousness of 
the Egyptian negotiations with the Franks, which obviously seemed more 
profĳitable to the wazir than an alliance with the Turks.
The decisive factor against the Frankish offfer was, according to Ray-
mond, letters from the Byzantine emperor to the Egyptian court inform-
ing them of the weakness of the crusading army and of Alexius Comnenus’ 
hatred of the Franks. These letters were captured when the Egyptian camp 
was plundered after the battle al-Bissa near Ascalon on 12 August 1099.131 
There can be no doubt about Raymond’s central statement, especially as 
he was not just an eyewitness, but the count of Toulouse’s chaplain and 
probably also occupied with chancery business.132 It has more than once 
been established that although the Egyptians were aware of the ethnic 
distinction between Franks and Greeks, they regarded the Crusade as a 
Byzantine undertaking in the old style.133 It was not only the course of 
the clashes up to the summer of 1098 which must have led al-Afdal to 
this conclusion. His envoys also found Byzantine troops in the crusading 
army before Antioch. The Franks were supplied from Byzantine Cyprus, 
mostly by Byzantine ships. The emperor himself carried out operations in 
Anatolia and in July 1098 while on march to Antioch. Since the Frankish 
embassy from Nicaea had travelled to Egypt on Alexius’ advice and by way 
of sea, for which a Greek ship was needed, it is quite possible that the Cru-
saders’ emissaries were joined to a Byzantine embassy. In any case, Greek 
seamen and inter preters must have accompanied them and for this rea-
son it must have looked like a Byzantine embassy. Probably Alexius had 
informed the Fatimids even before this of his undertakings against the 
common Turkish enemies. So al-Afdal probably considered the Franks as 
being in the service of the Byzantines and consequently as serious treaty 
partners. Therefore, he sent a counter-embassy to make soundings in the 
Frankish camp outside Antioch. There a sort of draft treaty was obviously 
131 Raim. Aguil., 109–10.
132 He composed at least the count’s letter of 1099 (Hagenmeyer, Epistulae, 167–74). 
Cf. Hagenmeyer, Brief.
133 Gibb, Notes, 740–1; Sivan, L’Islam, 25–6; Gabrieli, Introduction, 224–5.
© 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV, ISBN 978-90-04-24857-1
48 chapter one
negotiated, which promised the Crusaders help and indicated a conces-
sion in the question of Jerusalem. That al-Afdal, in order to gain as much 
as possible from the new situation, should also have ties with neighbour-
ing Muslim states (as the Provençal chronicler reported) is only natural. 
But it is of primary interest that the Crusaders, like the Egyptians, seem-
ingly engaged in serious negotiations.134
What was the course of the contacts between Franks and Fatimids in 
the following months? On 5 March 1098 Egyptian and Frankish envoys 
departed together for Egypt, where they must have arrived a few weeks 
later. In Shaʿban 491/4 July–1 August 1098, certainly after the arrival of the 
Christian envoys, al-Afdal left Cairo with a strong army, besieged Jerusa-
lem, granted very generous terms for capitulation some forty days later 
to the city’s rulers, Sukman and Ilghazi, and returned home after a short 
stay in Ascalon.135 That Egypt attempted to profĳit from the weakness of 
the Turks, brought about by the Frankish invasion, is not sufffĳicient expla-
nation for this expedition.136 Most notably it falls completely outside the 
existing framework of Fatimid policy in Syria. This, as already shown, 
had had three objectives in the previous fĳifteen years: direct rule over 
the coastal zone, the winning of recognition for the Fatimid caliphate in 
northern and central Syria and expansion in the south Syrian interior with 
Damascus rather than Jerusalem as its goal.
An attack on Damascus must have seemed promising in 1098 to a 
force such as that of al-Afdal. Duqaq must surely have seemed as feeble 
an opponent to the Egyptians as the Artuqid amirs of Jerusalem after his 
two heavy battles with the Crusaders. This fĳirst was on New Year’s Eve 
of 1097 in combination with Janah al-Dawla at al-Bara and the second 
on 28 June 1098 with Kirbogha before Antioch. Although Damascus must 
have had quite another attraction for the Fatimids than the economically 
and politically insignifĳicant Jerusalem, in 1098 al-Afdal gave priority to the 
difffĳicult siege of Jerusalem in its arid hills over an attack on Damascus.137 
134 The exact and detailed report on the Turkish offfer to Egypt proves the high degree 
of authenticity and reliability of Raim. Aguil., 109–10.
135 Ibn Muyassar, 65–6. Cf. Ibn Ẓāfĳir, 82; Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt, I, 162; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 
135; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 283; Raim. Aguil., 110; Albert of Aix, VI, XXXII, 485.
136 Albert of Aix, VI, XXXI, 484 and Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 283. For the secondary litera-
ture cf. for instance Runciman, History, I, 265.
137 The administrative and economic centre of inland Palestine was not the remote 
city of Jerusalem, but al-Ramla, which was probably Fatimid. Further to the north Tiberias 
was signifĳicant. In the Muslim period Jerusalem was only of religious signifĳicance, and 
even this should not be overestimated before the mid-twelfth century (Sivan, Caractère, 
179–82).
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Even if al-Afdal had been interested in the conquest of the Palestinian 
high lands with a view to securing the coast held by Egypt, an operation 
against weak Damascus would have been more sensible, because after its 
conquest Jerusalem would have been completely isolated and unable to 
hold out very long.138 What, then, was the attraction for al-Afdal of the 
capture of Jerusalem, since he thereby placed himself in dispute with the 
Crusaders? The wazir knew from his conversations with the envoys sent 
from Nicaea, if not earlier, that Jerusalem was the goal of the Franks and 
he was also aware that Jerusalem was worthless to impede an attack on 
Egypt. In general, it is remarkable that in spite of the momentary strength 
of Egypt, no adequate defending force opposed the Franks during their 
entry into the region of Fatimid suzerainty. It is interesting that in one 
line of Islamic historical tradition, al-Afdal would have allowed not Jeru-
salem, but Damascus to be captured in 1098. This report is quite obviously 
incorrect. It is, however, evidence that some chroniclers could envision 
Egyptian policy in 1098 only as following the customary course of the pre-
vious decades, i.e. as being directed against Damascus.139
Both Ekkehard of Aura, who as a pilgrim visited the site of the event 
two years later, and also the Historia belli sacri (c. 1140), report that the 
members of the Frankish embassy sent to Egypt in March 1098 visited 
Jerusalem during their absence from the crusading army. Ekkehard says 
that the ambassadors were present in al-Afdal’s besieging army and that 
he threatened the Artuqid lords of the city, alluding to his Frankish allies, 
that if they did not surrender the city to him, the Crusaders would fall upon 
them. On the other hand, the Historia says that al-Afdal and a Frankish 
delegation had seen the miracle of the Holy Fire in the Church of the Holy 
Sepulchre at Easter (10 April 1099). The ambassadors may have believed 
that the purpose of the capture of Jerusalem in their presence was to hand 
it over to the Crusaders. The wazir, however, had put Jerusalem in a posi-
tion of defence and then dismissed them with his own ambassadors to 
ʿArqa.140 It is not clear how reliable these accounts are, especially as the 
Historia may not be completely independent of Ekkehard. It is known, 
however, from other sources that after the taking of the city, al-Afdal 
138 To besiege Jerusalem was in any case technically difffĳicult, as the Crusaders were to 
discover, since the barrenness and lack of water presented logistical problems. For this 
reason al-Afdal sought from the outset to move the Artuqids to surrender by generous 
terms such as gifts and freedom to withdraw.
139 The oldest source is ʿImād al-Dīn, Bustān, 115. Cf. Ibn Abī al-Dam, 138v–39r and Ibn 
al-Dawādārī, VI, 450.
140 Ekkehard of Aura, XVI, 3–4, pp. 171–2; Hist. bell. sacri, CII–CIII, 214–5.
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paid special attention to the Holy Places and the native Christians.141 All 
this indicates that Egypt examined very seriously the Crusaders’ offfer as 
reported by Raymond of Aguilers. The capture of Jerusalem conformed 
to the content of the conversations before Antioch and the proposals of 
the Frankish envoys in Cairo. Al-Afdal attacked the Artuqid lords of Jeru-
salem, who in the region of Edessa and as allies of Kirbogha had proved 
themselves to be keen opponents of the Crusaders. As the new lord of 
Jerusalem, al-Afdal had the chance to purchase concessions with regard to 
the support of the Crusaders for his plans of revenge against the Turks. It 
cannot be determined whether al-Afdal had got as far as surrendering the 
city, granting the Christians a special legal status or only offfering freedom 
of entry for pilgrims and an absence of discrimina tion against Christians. 
Even in the fĳirst case the gain from an alliance with the Crusaders would 
have far outweighed the loss of Jerusalem for the Fatimids. It seems plau-
sible that al-Afdal possibly captured Jerusalem in order to be in a better 
position for negotiating with the Crusaders if two premises are taken into 
consideration; namely, that already during the eleventh century Jerusalem 
and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre had played an important part in 
negotiations between the Byzantines and the Fatimids and furthermore 
that since al-Afdal saw the Crusade as a Byzantine undertaking, he had 
no fear of the establishment of a kingdom of Jerusalem as a new political 
power in Palestine.
Until the summer of 1099, the talk among the Franks was still only of 
the liberation of the Holy Places. The phrase terra sancta, by contrast, 
implying a Christian claim to the possession of all Palestine and the 
coastal region of northern Syria, still makes no appearance whatsoever in 
the accounts by eyewitnesses of the First Crusade. Relevant to this is the 
demand of the Franks to al-Afdal, according to Raymond of Aguilers, for 
the cession of Jerusalem cum pertinenciis suis, which in accordance with 
the contemporary administrative structure could mean, not the whole 
of Palestine, but at most the non-Egyptian Palestinian highlands, i.e. the 
Artuqid lordship. Various elements indicate that no clear ideas held sway 
among the Crusaders concerning Jerusalem and that they might possibly 
have been satisfĳied with the cession of those territories near to Jerusa-
lem that the Emperor Frederick II obtained in his treaty of 1229 with the 
141 Raim. Aguil., 110; Albert of Aix, VI, XXXII, 485. According to William of Tyre, VII, 
XXIII, 314–5, there was discrimination against the Christians before the Crusaders’ attack, 
as it was feared that they would collaborate with the Franks.
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Ayyubid Sultan al-Malik al-Kamil.142 These elements include the speedy 
advance of the crusading army on Jerusalem without any methodical con-
quest of Palestine as a whole, the fact that until immediately before the 
taking of the city there were no legal notions about its later fate, the low 
number of Franks staying there as well as the previous realization of the 
territorial ambitions of individual Frankish princes in northern Syria.
In this connection it is instructive that Muslim chroniclers beginning 
with Ibn Zafĳir, one of the earliest and best reporters of this period, also 
believed in an Egyptian interest in cooperation with the Crusaders. The 
Wazir al-Afdal, it is said, regretted after the creation of a Frankish state in 
Jerusalem that he had weakened the Muslim cause with his operations of 
1098. This regret, thinks Ibn Zafĳir, was thoroughly out of place, since al-
Afdal himself had shown a sympathetic attitude to the Frankish invasion 
of the Palestinian coastal region, as he wished to install them as a bufffer 
against renewed Turkish attacks on the Nile valley. Al-Afdal therefore did 
not want to limit the Crusaders to northern Syria; on the other hand, he 
was not interested in a strong Frankish state that would threaten Egypt 
no less than the Turks.143 This position no longer appears so inconsistent 
as it seemed at fĳirst sight, if one calls to mind the previous fĳindings: that 
al-Afdal’s negotiations with the Franks seemed to enable him to restore 
Egyptian rule in Syria, that the Franks had still no idea of setting up a 
strong state in Palestine, but were solely concerned with Jerusalem as a 
holy city and fĳinally that in the preceding decades there had been prec-
edents for negotiations with the Byzantines over the status of the Holy 
Places. As mentioned, the wazir had every reason to connect the Crusade 
with Byzantium.
Nevertheless, the negotiations between the Franks and the Fatimids 
came to nothing. The Frankish embassy was detained in Egypt, which 
Raymond of Aguilers ascribes to the Byzantine emperor’s letters to al-
Afdal. Lilie has cast doubt on the existence of this correspondence and of 
the whole of Raymond’s account, ascribing it to the anti-Greek bias of the 
chronicler. He argues that no other sources confĳirm Raymond and that 
his report is illogical, fĳirstly because Byzantium had no reason to incite 
Egypt against the Crusaders and the Fatimids would not have agreed to a 
proposal such as Raymond described, since it would have  violated their 
142 The Christian sources express disappointment that al-Afdal did not voluntarily 
give away Jerusalem: Raim. Aguil., 110; Ekkehard of Aura, XVI, 4, p. 171; Albert of Aix, VI, 
XXXII, 485.
143 Ibn Ẓāfĳir, 82. Cf. Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 273.
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hemisphere; secondly, because there is no reason for al-Afdal to have 
taken the emperor’s letters with him to Ascalon, where they are said to 
have been captured.144 These arguments against Raymond are unconvinc-
ing. It has already been shown that Egypt could have drawn much profĳit 
from the Crusaders’ offfer and also Byzantine diplomacy had taken up the 
question of the Holy Places before the Crusade. Al-Afdal’s capture of Jeru-
salem is only to be understood against the background of the Frankish 
offfers. Furthermore, Raymond possessed in his position all the prerequi-
sites to be well informed. Had his account of the capture of the Byzantine 
letters rested on invention pure and simple, such an audacious untruth 
would surely not have remained uncontradicted among the numerous 
eye witnesses who read his work. That other sources give no information 
about the letters proves little. By contrast, Oriental sources believe that 
Alexius repeatedly conspired against the Crusaders, although on other 
occasions.145
Furthermore, the Byzantines no longer had any control over the Cru-
sade after July 1098. The Byzantine troops in the army had withdrawn 
before Kirbogha’s arrival. Thereafter Alexius Comnenus was concerned to 
prevent the creation of autonomous Frankish lordships, as Lilie himself 
observes. He demanded the handing over of Antioch without allowing 
it to come to an open breach and endeavoured to hinder the departure 
of the Crusade. Hence, it is only natural that Alexius was also interested 
from 1098 in preventing a possible alliance between the Crusaders and the 
Egyptians. Finally, that al-Afdal brought the Byzantine correspondence to 
Ascalon is more probable than otherwise. Although the Crusaders fĳirst 
rejected at ʿArqa his offfer to allow unarmed pilgrims free access to Jeru-
salem and developments moved towards a conflict between Franks and 
Fatimids, the Egyptians seemed not to have given up hope of a diplomatic 
solution. Ibn al-Athir and Ibn Muyassar (d. 677/1278), who are among the 
best informed chroniclers of the history of the period, report that directly 
before the battle of al-Bissa an envoy was sent to the Franks, censuring 
them for the taking of Jerusalem.146 In spite of the hardening of the Egyp-
tian position during the conversations at ʿArqa, the Fatimids probably still 
144 Lilie, Byzanz, 51–2.
145 Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 273; Chronicon ad A.C. 1234 pertinens, II, 40.
146 Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 286 and Ibn Muyassar, 67, lack corroboration. However, since 
both conform fully with Christian sources in regard to the events of the conquest of Jeru-
salem, the statement has a certain value.
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believed in a negotiated solution until the summer of 1099. Apparently, 
the Frankish siege of Jerusalem surprised them. It is thus plausible that 
al-Afdal should have brought the papers concerning the Franks with him 
from his chancery.
Having regard to the state of the sources, all considerations of supra-
regional relationships during the First Crusade rest on circumstantial 
evidence. Raymond of Aguilers’ description of the course of negotiations, 
however, seems well-founded. As long as Egypt judged the Crusade to be 
a Byzantine undertaking for the recovery of territory, al-Afdal was ready 
to resume the entente with Byzantium, which had been efffective as late 
as the second third of the eleventh century. He was also prepared to make 
some concessions in regard to Jerusalem which would hardly have been 
painful compared to the expected profĳit. A letter from the emperor dat-
ing from late summer or early autumn 1098 had made the Fatimids aware 
of the breach between Byzantium and Crusaders in the meantime. From 
the Egyptian point of view, the Franks had become a freely acting power 
which no longer had full Byzantine support. Since Egypt had as little inter-
est as Byzantium in the founding of Frankish states, which would threaten 
Egypt like the creation of the Turkish lordships two decades before, al-
Afdal gave up his plans for an alliance. The Frankish envoys lost their 
accreditation in al-Afdal’s eyes with the letter from Byzantium and were 
detained following Islamic usage, which stipulated the nullifĳication of 
the immunity of unaccredited envoys. Only when the Crusaders began to 
penetrate the Fatimid sphere of influence at ʿArqa did al-Afdal endeav-
our to neutralize the danger arising from the Franks. For this he not only 
made military preparations in Palestine, but he also sent gifts, released 
the envoys and offfered freedom of pilgrimage for the Crusaders. However, 
he could not surrender Jerusalem, since an autonomous Frankish state 
founded in the south would most probably not be satisfĳied with Jerusa-
lem. The Crusaders reacted sharply to the wazir’s offfer that was, compared 
with his earlier promises, very limited. They deemed themselves betrayed 
and seriously discussed an attack on Egypt at al-Ramla at the beginning 
of June 1099. This scheme failed on account of the weakness of the avail-
able forces and of the peregrinis’ pressure fĳinally to proceed to Jerusa-
lem. For this reason the Franks also left the Fatimid coastal towns south 
of Tripoli unmolested.147 The Crusaders were uninterested in attacks on 
147 Al-Ramla: Raim. Aguil., 136–7. With ʿArqa and Antartus the Crusaders reached the 
region in which the Fatimid khutba was recognized.
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these places and skirmishes occurred only in the surroundings of Sidon. 
During the fortnight the Franks needed to travel from ʿArqa to al-Ramla, 
treaties were concluded with Beirut and Acre. In both cases, the Crusad-
ers were provided with food after they had promised not to destroy the 
crop. The Crusaders obtained assurance on oath that in the event of their 
victory over the Fatimids, those places would be surrendered or at least 
placed under Frankish suzerainty.148 Nothing more clearly demonstrates 
that under the pressure of the peregrini the advance to Jerusalem had 
precedence. Since the treaty with Tripoli, the princes were forced to set 
aside their endeavours to establish states and to be satisfĳied with unsure 
promises of later surrender.
In summary, at the time of the arrival of the First Crusade in northern 
Syria Pope Urban II and the Emperor Alexius Comnenus lost all direct 
influence on the execution of the enterprise. In the course of the preach-
ing of the Crusade since 1095, the idea of the liberation of Jerusalem had 
taken the place of the original plan of coming to the help of Byzantium 
against the Turkish attacks. The religious emotions aroused by the propa-
ganda for the Crusade, as well as the dire economic situation in France 
at the end of the eleventh century and ever-present feuds, inadequately 
restrained by the Truce of God movement, resulted in the inclusion in the 
crusading movement of great bodies of unarmed pilgrims to Jerusalem, 
pauperes or peregrini. From the summer of 1097 and the taking of Nicaea, 
the remainder of these bands together with the contingents of knights of 
the diffferent princes formed the crusading army, in which their numbers 
surpassed those of the knights many times. The Crusaders of knightly and 
aristocratic origin were diffferentiated into two groups, one which under-
stood the Crusade as above all an armed pilgrimage and another which 
was primarily concerned with the taking of land and the foundation of 
lordships. To the latter belonged the Lorrainers Godfrey and Baldwin, the 
Norman Bohemond and the Provençal Raymond. It became clear that the 
divergence of interests between these two groups stamped the further 
course of the Crusade, at latest from the siege of Antioch in the winter 
of 1097–98. As leader of the peregrini, Raymond of Toulouse found him-
self in a particularly precarious situation. The pressure of the pilgrims to 
advance on Jerusalem made it impossible for him to establish a lordship 
in the north.
148 Cafffaro, IX, 56. Beirut: Albert of Aix, V, XXXIX, 458. Acre: Raim. Aguil., 135.
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What does this signify for the relations of the Crusaders with the indig-
enous peoples and the amirs and rulers of the Muslim states in the Middle 
East? Obviously, the Crusaders did indeed regard the Muslims as heathen 
and the idea of slaying the heathen was thoroughly pervasive in the treat-
ment of defeated Muslims, especially among the pauperes, peregrini and 
the Provençals. Frankish conduct was more flexible only if it was a case, as 
in Saruj, of the foundation of a lordship and if there was no pressure from 
the part of the simple pilgrims. Yet on the other hand, similar structures 
were ascribed to the Islamic world and to the Christian commonwealth. 
Not least because there was supposed to be a genealogical relationship 
between Franks and Turks, and the military performance of the Turks was 
impressive, it was not hard for the Frankish chivalry to recognize their 
opponents as of equal status. The consciousness of this equality of sta-
tus among knights probably made it simpler to enter into treaty relations 
with individual Muslim rulers in spite of the widespread heathen-killing 
mentality among the Crusaders. For this there were two motives. In the 
fĳirst place, Frankish-Muslim treaties served the purpose of the foundation 
of states. In both cases in which the acquisition of land took place in the 
neighbourhood of Muslim lordships, alliances and treaties accompanied 
this, which came into existence from a position of Frankish strength and 
from Muslim initiative. Oaths and hostages secured these treaties and 
they mostly included the Muslim payment of tribute. The conversion of 
the Muslim party might have been made a requirement for the conclu-
sion of the treaty only in the case of Tripoli—but it is very signifĳicant that 
this served tactical aims only and was not grounded on religious scru-
ples. The demand was later allowed to lapse. In the second place, several 
treaties secured the unhindered advance of the Franks to Jerusalem on 
which the peregrini insisted. In some cases this resulted in the placing of 
Muslim lordships under Frankish suzerainty, quite certainly in the case 
of  Maraqiyya, possibly also in that of Tripoli and Beirut. This was mani-
fested in the payment of tribute and the raising of Frankish banners on 
the city walls. It is difffĳicult to decide whether the treaties were purely a 
matter of neutrality and peace or whether the Muslim party understood 
these treaties (which have been transmitted only in Latin sources) also as 
subordination to Frankish overlordship. The Crusaders themselves always 
considered all treaty partners as their tributaries and justifĳied the conclu-
sion of the agreements to the pope by the small number of their troops.149 
149 Hagenmeyer, Epistulae, 170.
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Equally, no hesitation in the conclusion of treaties with the Crusad-
ers can be ascertained on the Muslim side. Small lordships offfered little 
 resistance to the Crusade; they provided guides as well as hostages and 
even sold military goods. In this way they continued their policy of neu-
trality, which in the three previous decades they had pursued during the 
conflicts among the Seljuks and those between the Turks and the Fatim-
ids. Aleppo and Damascus concluded no agreements with the Franks.150 
If, however, the evidence of the sources is not misleading, the Crusader 
princes were also ready for supra-regional diplomatic contacts to secure 
the success of their undertaking. The fĳirst impulse to this came very prob-
ably from Byzantium. If the relevant circumstantial evidence is close to the 
actual development, the Franks and Egypt were ready for a far-reaching 
alliance against the Turks; even the ways of partitioning rule and the joint 
possession of captured cities were discussed. Egypt integrated the Cru-
sade into its conception of the recovery of the Syrian possessions lost to 
the Turks. The taking of Jerusalem by the Wazir al-Afdal in the summer 
of 1098 can plausibly be explained only as the consequence of an alliance 
between the Franks and the Fatimids. The causes of the failure of these 
contacts are to be found in the fact that the Egyptians were informed of 
the discord between Byzantium and the Crusaders and started to fear the 
establish ment of a Crusader lordship in Palestine. It was not the princes 
who aspired to establish states, but the mass of simple pilgrims who urged 
on the march to Jerusalem who prevented a union with Egypt.
Thus, an abundance of relations through treaties, alliances and perhaps 
even suzerainties arose already during the First Crusade. The variety of 
interests of the groups participating in the Crusade and the idea of the 
equality of status between Frankish and Turkish knights facilitated this 
development. The Syrian system of autonomous lordships in 1098–99, in 
turn, favoured the treaty policy of individual Frankish leaders. The rivalry 
between the great metropolitan cities and the lack of a supreme power 
contributed to the fact that the Crusaders did not confront a united Mus-
lim Syria. The traditional policy of neutrality of the petty Arab lordships 
of central Syria and the antagonism between Fatimids and Turks (both 
marked out as specifĳic characteristics of this system) were congenial to 
the Frankish interest in treaties. The Crusaders were integrated as a new 
element in the structure of alliances and conflicts in the Middle East—
and apparently allowed themselves to be integrated without difffĳiculty. 
150 Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 275.
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The factors which favoured or impeded the treaty policy during the First 
Crusade—such as the endeavour to extend and secure states or the difffer-
ence of interests between founders of states and pilgrims—must be kept 
in mind when investi gating Frankish-Muslim relationships in the twelfth 
century. The events from 1097 to 1099 give a fĳirst impression of the subse-
quent Frankish-Muslim relationships in the twelfth century. 
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